

PATTERNS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN
PENNSYLVANIA'S
1982 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION

James Eisenstein

Pennsylvania State University

This paper analyzes sources of contributions to virtually all candidates for Pennsylvania legislative office in 1982 who reported raising or spending more than \$250 in any of six reporting periods.

Contributions totaling nearly \$7,750,000 were examined. Almost half came in amounts greater than \$250. About 20% came from contributions of \$50 or less from individuals; an equal proportion came from individuals giving between \$50 and \$250.

Political Action Committee contributions received special scrutiny. About 27% of all money raised came from PACs, split evenly between Republicans and Democrats. But PAC money heavily favored incumbents by a three to one margin. In sharp contrast to political party contributions, PACs gave almost as much to candidates assured of victory or even unopposed as to those in close races. Labor PACs gave about as much as professional PACs, but were outspent two to one by business PACs. Overall, PACs accounted for nearly 37% of incumbents' receipts, suggesting their role is greater than in U.S. Congressional elections.

INTRODUCTION

Two significant but little noticed developments suggest the increasing importance of studies of state legislative campaign financing. First, the amounts raised and spent jumped substantially in the past several years. Second, Political Action Committees (PACs) and lobbyists affiliated with them devote increasing attention and resources to state legislatures. Both the study of state politics and the role of PACs in the political system require that we acknowledge PAC activity in the states and study its form and impact.

Even an unsystematic and quick examination of state legislative campaign expenditures demonstrates their rapid escalation. Average campaign receipts in contested State House races in Florida for incumbent Democrats jumped from \$25,217 in 1978 to \$41,595 in 1980; for incumbent Republicans the increase was from \$22,642 to \$28,958 (Giles and Pritchard, 1983). Total spending for races in both houses doubled between the two most recent elections in California, Michigan, and New Jersey (Jaffe, 1983). The actual amounts spent are substantial. Winning candidates for California's State Assembly in 1982 spent an average of \$429,000 (Turner, 1984). Total expenditures for California's legislative races in 1982 topped \$42 million (Jaffe, 1983).¹ While other states haven't matched California's totals, the amounts spent are substantial by historical standards.² Ruth Jones, a political scientist specializing in studying state campaign finance, was recently quoted as identifying the increasing cost of state legislative campaigns as "a sleeper. It's been happening all over the country, but nobody has realized it" (cited in Jaffe, 1983).

At the same time, PACs have become increasingly active at the state level. Membership in The State Governmental Affairs Council, a Washington based association of corporate lobbyists working in the states, increased from 36 to 110 during the last eight years. An analyst for the Council of State Legislatures noted an increase in national lobbies' influence: "National interests are starting to have an effect on state government." As state responsibility for the expenditure of federal block grant money increases, and as state regulation replaces federal

regulation, the significance of state legislative actions to major lobbies has grown.³

To what extent has Pennsylvania experienced growth in campaign expenditures and lobbying activity? I know of no scholarly studies of recent vintage of either topic. But a recent two-part newspaper series on the growth of lobbying in Pennsylvania by Gary Rotstein (1984a, 1984b) offers some interesting highlights. Rotstein reports that the number of registered PACs at the end of 1983 (487) represented close to double the number registered in 1980. His interviews with lobbyists and legislative leaders led him to conclude that powerful lobbying groups have come to play an increasingly influential role in the legislative process. Particularly telling is the observation attributed to Republican Majority Whip Senator John Stauffer: "I can't think of a time before when we had outside groups doing so much of our work." When it comes to the totals raised and spent in Pennsylvania legislative campaigns, however, practically no published data are available. This study presents preliminary analysis of data on the financing of Pennsylvania's 1982 legislative elections.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

To permit comparison of campaign finance patterns between winners and losers in both the primary and general election, an effort was made to gather data on all candidates. The Bureau of Elections' "official results" of the 1982 primary provided the basic list of candidates for whom data was sought. Each candidate listed in the official results was assigned an identification number (the candidate "ID"). Some candidates withdrew or died after the primary; their replacements received new identification numbers. The candidate's name, ID number, party, district, office sought (house or senate), and primary performance (won/lost/withdrew; margin in percent of total vote cast by which the candidate won or lost) were entered on the first page of the data gathering form.

Two techniques were used to transfer information for the candidates' campaign expense reports to the form. Student volunteers who went to their county board of election over

vacation completed some. The rest were filled out by two research assistants who took the remaining uncompleted forms to the Bureau of Elections in Harrisburg. Work study students filled in the rest of the information on the first page of the form, and edited the forms for completeness and consistency. The data was then entered and verified. The data were placed in as SPSS system file and checked for wild data entries and consistency before analysis began.

The data set produced was rather large. Each of the 630 candidates for whom information was found could have reported campaign receipts and expenses on as many as 12 separate reports. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the 630 candidates. Campaign finance information exists for 64 Senate candidates and 556 House candidates. Data on every winner and loser in the general election for the Senate is included (25 winners, 23 losers, with 2 winners unopposed); all 203 House victors, including 25 losers, with 2 winners unopposed); all 203 House victors, including 25 who were unopposed, are in the data set, along with 181 losers. This constitutes virtually the complete universe of candidates who ran and filed reports.⁴

Several checks on the internal consistency of the data suggest no major errors. For example, the number of incumbents for whom we have data is 202; the number of candidates who are coded as being in the legislature in the "CHAIR81" variable [was this candidate a committee chair or vice chair in the past legislature?: 1=yes, 5=no, 9=not in legislature] was also 202. Most crucial was the comparison of the total amount of money received. Two independent calculations of the total contributions received, each based on independent entries in the campaign expense reporting forms, were made. The first consisted of adding the entries made in item "B" in each report filed, the "Total Receipts." The second was computed by summing the contributions reported in each report filed by each candidate in three categories (\$50 or less; \$50.01 to \$250; and more than \$250) on a separate "summary" page in the campaign expense reporting form. The first total [the variable termed "GOT"] equaled \$7,744,667. The second method produced a total of \$7,696,649. The difference of \$48,018 is only about 0.6 percent of the total. Part of the small

Table 1
 Summary of Data Set Characteristics
 1982 Pennsylvania Legislative Candidates' Campaign Finance Patterns

	Pennsylvania House of Representative					
	PRIMARY ELECTION			GENERAL ELECTION		
	Winners	Losers	Total	Winners	Losers	Total
DEMOCRATS	189	114	303	102	84	186
(incumbents)	(82)	(6)	(88)	(79)	(2)	(81)
(non-incumbents)	(107)	(108)	(215)	(23)	(82)	(105)
REPUBLICANS	195	61	256	101	92	193
(incumbents)	(91)	(2)	(93)	(86)	(5)	(91)
(non-incumbents)	(104)	(59)	(163)	(15)	(87)	(102)
INDEPENDENTS	7		7		5	5
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total	391	175	566	203	181	384
	Pennsylvania Senate					
DEMOCRATS	24	10	34	12	12	24
(incumbents)	(9)	(1)	(10)	(9)	0	(9)
(non-incumbents)	(15)	(9)	(24)	(3)	(12)	(15)
REPUBLICANS	22	6	28	13	10	23
(incumbents)	(11)	0	(11)	(10)	(1)	(11)
(non-incumbents)	(11)	(6)	(17)	(3)	(9)	(12)
INDEPENDENTS	2		2		1	1
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total	48	16	64	25	23	48

discrepancy is due to the fact that the candidates' reports were sometimes internally inconsistent, listing different totals for the two entries.

Table 2 displays the principal analysis variables. The amounts received constitute the principal dependent variables. In addition to the total received, contributions are classified by the size of the contribution (the three categories mentioned above) and the source of the contribution. The principal independent variables are the candidate's party affiliation, the office sought (House or Senate), status as an incumbent or non-incumbent (and if an incumbent, whether a leadership post or committee chairmanship or vice-chairmanship was held), election outcome, and size of the margin of victory or defeat. For some purposes, of course, election outcome measures can be treated as the dependent variable.

For many of the variables, separate values were calculated for the primary and general election. These variables are designated in the dataset by a "P" or "G" in the variable name (for example, "LABORP" is the amount of labor PAC contributions in the primary). Since many candidates lost in the primary, they cannot be included in analyses of general election patterns. But money spent in the primary in a winning cause affects the general election to some extent since publicity, campaign organization, literature, and so forth can be utilized in the general election. Further, some candidates (especially those unopposed in the primary) raise money during the primary season but do not spend it till the periods covered by the general election reports are filed. These complications require that both elections' reports be analyzed separately for some purposes, and that they be combined for others.

Table 2
Principal Variables Used in Description and Analysis of
1982 Pennsylvania Legislative Campaign Finance

Variable Name	Description
Dependent Variables	
GOT	Total contributions received calculated by summing amount listed in "receipts" for each report filed
HAD	Total contributions (GOT) plus carry over from previous campaigns (Previous balance)
SPENT	Total expenditures made calculated by summing amounts listed in "expenditures" for each report filed
@550 @STO250 @SOV250	Total contributions summed from each report filed in amount of \$50 or less (@550), \$50.01 to \$250 (@STO250), and more than \$250 (@SOV250)
PACTOTAL	Total contributions from all Political Action Committees listed on all reports filed
BUSINESS	Total contributions from business PACs
LABOR	Total contributions from labor PACs
PROFESS	Total contributions from professional PACs (lawyers, optometrists, etc.)
IDEO	Total contributions from ideological PACs (NRA, NOW, etc.)
MISCPACS	Total contributions of unidentified or unclassifiable PACs
PARTYS	Total contributions from all committees affiliated with a political party listed on all reports filed
CHANCOMI	Total contributions from legislative campaign committees
COUNPART	Total contributions from county party committees
CITYPART	Total contributions from city party committees
OTHERPAR	Total contributions from other party committees (GOP women, etc.)
CANDCOMI	Total contributions from all committees affiliated with other candidates for political office listed on all reports filed
SELFTO	Total of contributions from "self"--the candidate and his/her immediate family
LAWFIRMS	Total contributions given in the name of law firms on all reports filed

Table 2 (continued)

Variable Name	Description
Dependent Variables (continued)	
OVER\$250	Total contributions from individuals who gave more than \$250 in any one reporting period on all reports filed
MISCTOT	Total contributions from miscellaneous sources (interest, refunds on deposits, fund raisers, etc.)
Independent Variables	
PARTY	Candidate's party affiliation
CHAMBER	Office sought: House or Senate
INCUMB	Whether candidate was an incumbent legislator
LEADERB1	Whether, if an incumbent, the candidate was a leader in his or her party caucus
CHAIRB1	Whether, if an incumbent, the candidate was a committee or subcommittee vice-chair or chair in the previous legislature
P.RESULT	Whether the candidate won or lost the primary election
G.RESULT	Whether the candidate won or lost the general election
P.MARGIN G.MARGIN	Margin of victory or defeat: the percentage points separating the winner from the loser (a 56% to 44% race = 12% "Margin")

GENERAL PATTERNS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE 1982 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

Background

Elections to the Pennsylvania legislature always coincide either with a Presidential election or a Gubernatorial contest. The 1982 race for Governor appeared to be a walkover for the popular incumbent Republican, Richard Thornburgh. Only in the final days of the campaign did the surge of his significantly outspent rival, Congressman Allen Ertel, become evident. But the closeness of the battle for party control of the legislature, particularly the House of Representatives, was clear from the outset. The Republicans held a 26 to 24 edge in the Senate and a five vote margin (103 to 98 with two vacancies) in the House. Complicating the election was the fact that this was the first election contested under the new legislative reapportionment. Despite the substantial population shifts necessitating a significant revision of district lines, the reapportionment commission's five members (a law school dean and an incumbent party leader from each party in each house) managed to almost completely avoid putting incumbents in the same district.

Whether or not the Reapportionment Commission sought explicitly to protect incumbents, the fact remains that those who sought re-election did very well. In the Senate, 21 of 25 incumbents up for a new term sought re-election. All but two succeeded. In the House, 172 incumbents ran in the general election; seven lost--a 97 percent return rate. Another eight lost in the primary. Thus, of the 180 House incumbents trying for a new term, 167 (93 percent) succeeded. The Republicans increased their Senate margin by one (27-23), but lost control in the House by a one seat margin (102-101).

Although the partisan balance hung by a thread in both chambers, competition in the individual districts was much less vigorous. In the House, only 11 percent of the general election candidates got between 45 percent and 55 percent of the vote; another 17 percent received 40 percent to 44 percent or 56 percent to 60 percent; fully 72 percent of the candidates won or lost by more than a 20 percent margin. Even less

competition emerged in the primary, where 78 percent of the candidates won or lost by more than 20 percent. In the Senate, the comparable figures are 70 percent in the general election and 90 percent in the primary. Table 3 summarizes these data.

Total Contributions and Their Sources

The 630 candidates reported contributions of nearly \$7,750,000, and expenditures of nearly \$7,400,000. The ending balance of some \$367,000 of receipts over expenditures nearly matches the total reported as carry-over "previous balance" in the first campaign expense form filed in January 1982 (\$382,000). These figures put Pennsylvania's legislative election costs about the same level as New Jersey (1981) and Michigan (1982). As expected, House candidates raised and spent more money as a group, but the averages for the Senate are three to four times higher. Table 4A summarizes total receipts and expenditures. The averages displayed must be viewed cautiously, since they include candidates who spent nothing or (in the case of primary losers in the general election) did not run.

Table 4B summarizes data on contributions in a slightly different way. The disclosure statute requires candidates to list the total of all contributions of \$50 or less, \$50.01 through \$250, and over \$250.

As the first column of Table 4B shows, almost half of the money raised to finance the 1982 legislative elections came in the form of large contribution of over \$250. Contributions in amounts of \$50 or less, within the range of most citizens, account for only one in every five dollars raised. House candidates rely a little more on such small donations (23.6 percent versus 13.1 percent for Senate candidates), and a little less on large ones (45.7 percent versus 53.7 percent). The tendency to rely on large contributions seems a little more pronounced for the general election than for the primary.

Table 3
Margins of Victory or Defeat for House and Senate Candidates,
1982 Primary and General Election

	HOUSE				SENATE			
	Primary		General		Primary		General	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Close: 45% to 50% of vote	73	13.0	42	11.1	6	9.4	11	22.9
Competitive: 56% to 60% or 40% to 44%	47	8.4	63	16.6	0	0.0	4	8.3
Safe: 61% to 70% or 30% to 39%	91	16.2	129	33.9	10	15.6	24	50.0
Assured: 71% to 99% or 1% to 29%	68	12.1	121	31.8	10	15.6	7	14.6
Unopposed	282	50.3	25	6.6	38	59.4	2	4.2
Total	561	100.0	389	100.0	64	100.0	48	100.0

Table 4A
Total Raised, Available, and Spent by 1982 Pennsylvania Legislative Candidates

	All Candidates N=630		House Candidates N=566		Senate Candidates N=64	
	Total	Average	Total	Average	Total	Average
Total Contributions Received	7,744,677	12,293	5,375,027	9,497	2,369,650	37,026
(Primary only)	(3,356,821)	(5,328)	(2,239,442)	(3,957)	(1,117,379)	(17,459)
(General only)	(4,387,856)	(6,956)	(3,135,585)	(5,540)	(1,252,271)	(19,567)
Total Expenditures	7,377,768	11,710	5,223,918	9,230	2,153,850	33,654
(Primary only)	(2,852,929)	(4,528)	(2,012,768)	(3,556)	(840,161)	(13,128)
(General only)	(4,524,839)	(7,184)	(3,211,150)	(5,673)	(1,313,689)	(20,526)
Total Funds Available*	8,122,979	12,894	5,660,849	10,002	2,462,130	38,471

*Funds available consist of contributions received plus balances acquired prior to the first reporting period (including funds left over from the previous campaigns).

Table 4B
Proportion of Funds Received by Size of Contribution, 1982 Pennsylvania Legislative Candidates

	All Candidates N=630		House Candidates N=566		Senate Candidates N=64	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
All contributions of \$50 or less	1,571,858	20.4	1,261,201	23.6	310,657	13.1
(Primary only)	(773,819)	(23.2)	(625,100)	(28.2)	(148,719)	(13.2)
(General only)	(798,039)	(18.3)	(636,101)	(20.4)	(161,938)	(13.1)
Contributions between \$50 and \$250	2,419,131	31.4	1,635,586	30.7	783,545	33.2
(Primary only)	(1,063,477)	(31.9)	(645,063)	(29.1)	(418,414)	(37.3)
(General only)	(1,355,654)	(31.1)	(990,523)	(31.8)	(365,131)	(29.4)
All contributions over \$250	3,705,660	48.2	2,436,472	45.7	1,269,188	53.7
(Primary only)	(1,500,889)	(44.9)	(945,917)	(42.7)	(554,972)	(49.5)
(General only)	(2,204,771)	(50.6)	(1,490,555)	(47.8)	(714,216)	(57.5)
Total all contributions	7,696,649	100.0	5,333,259	100.0	2,363,390	100.0
(Total primary only)	(3,338,185)	(100.0)	(2,216,080)	(100.0)	(1,122,105)	(100.0)
(Total general only)	(4,358,464)	(100.0)	(3,117,179)	(100.0)	(1,241,285)	(100.0)

Sources of contributions analyzed fell into seven categories: contributions of \$50 or less, which are unitemized on the reports and assumed to come from individuals, individuals giving over \$250, PAC and party committee contributions over \$50, money from the candidate and his or her immediate family, a miscellaneous grouping of several categories, and a residual category composed mostly of individuals giving between \$50 and \$250.

Contributions from Political Action Committees constitute the most significant category of contributor among those analyzed in Table 5. Just over one of every four dollars received came from a PAC. Contributions from individuals in amounts within the means of most citizens in Pennsylvania (\$50 or less) accounted for one dollar in five. Candidates rely very little on "grass roots" support; even if some of the funds from party committees and miscellaneous sources initially came from small contributions, it is clear that less than one-third of all campaign funds come in small amounts.⁵ Individual contributions of more than \$50 make up over a quarter of total receipts. Political party committees, on the other hand, give less than 10 percent of the total. The remaining significant category consists of money put into the campaign by the candidate and his or her immediate family. One dollar in eight came from candidates themselves--close to \$950,000 in all.

Several differences in the sources of contributions to House versus Senate candidates emerged. Senate candidates rely less on small individual contributions and more on those above \$50 (37 percent of Senate candidates' total versus 22 percent for House candidates). Senate candidates and their families give somewhat less, but party committees and PACs account for the same proportion of funds.

Table 5
Major Sources of Contributions to Legislative Candidates in Pennsylvania, 1982

Source of Contributions	All Candidates N=630		House Candidates N=566		Senate Candidates N=64	
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Individuals giving \$50 or less	1,571,858	20.3	1,261,201	23.5	310,657	13.1
Individuals giving \$50.01 to \$250*	1,525,815	19.7	905,691	16.9	620,124	26.2
Individuals giving over \$250	542,210	7.0	288,587	5.4	253,623	10.7
Candidate and immediate family	942,117	12.2	740,841	13.8	201,276	8.5
Political Action Committees (PACs)	2,114,530	27.3	1,475,501	27.5	639,029	27.0
Party Committees	663,868	8.6	453,783	8.4	210,085	8.9
Miscellaneous**	384,279	5.0	249,423	4.6	134,856	5.7
Total	7,744,677	100.1	5,375,027	100.1	2,369,650	100.1

*Estimate. This is a residual category, and amount remaining after all other types of contributions itemized in the schedule of contributions over \$50 were calculated. I believe this is a good approximation of how much candidates received from individuals contributing in the \$50.01 to \$250 range.

**The sum of contributions from law firms, unincorporated businesses, other candidate committees and other miscellaneous sources (fund raisers, interest on deposits, refunds, etc.).

The Relationship Between Contributions and Major Candidate Characteristics

A number of reasonable hypotheses can be generated regarding the differences in the major sources of campaign funds relied upon by Democrats and Republicans. In a highly partisan state, where both business and labor are well organized, such differences should be no cause for surprise. Table 6 compares how Republican and Democratic candidates for the legislature raised contributions. The results are striking. Virtually no differences emerged whatsoever, with the possible exception that, on average, Republicans raised somewhat more.

This does not mean differences do not exist in the sources of contributions within categories. I will compare the types of PACs giving to each party's candidates below, for example. But in broad terms, Republicans do not rely more heavily on their candidates' personal wealth or on contributions exceeding \$250 from individuals; Democrats do not rely more on small contributions of \$50 or less. The existing system of legislative campaign finance overwhelms any potential differences based on party, resulting in each party's candidates producing funds in very similar ways.

Contributions to incumbents versus non-incumbents, on the other hand, present a sharp contrast to the similarity in Democrats versus Republicans. In particular, the legislative campaign finance system significantly favors incumbents. They received on average 2.7 times as much as non-incumbents (\$21,470 versus \$7,962). Furthermore, important differences exist in the sources of their funds. Political Action Committees heavily favor incumbents, giving the 202 incumbents three times the total contributed to the 428 non-incumbents. Non-incumbents draw much more heavily on their own personal wealth and that of their family; over 21 percent of their funds came from this source; for incumbents, the percentage is less than five.

Table 6
 Comparison of Sources of Campaign Contributions in the 1982 Pennsylvania
 Legislative Election: Democrats vs. Republicans

	Democrats N=338		Republicans N=285	
	Amount	Percent	Amount	Percent
Individuals giving \$50 or less	799,341	20.6	770,982	20.0
Individuals giving \$50.01 to \$250	733,838	18.9	791,797	20.5
Individuals giving over \$250	277,807	7.2	264,403	6.8
Candidates and immediate family	532,076	13.7	409,351	10.6
Political Action Committees - PACs	1,075,395	27.7	1,039,135	26.9
Party Committees	282,549	7.3	380,619	9.9
Miscellaneous	180,998	4.7	203,281	5.3
Total	3,882,004	100.0	3,859,568	100.0
Mean Receipts	11,485		13,542	

Table 7
 Comparison of Sources of Campaign Contributions in the 1982 Pennsylvania
 Legislative Election: All Candidates (House and Senate Combined)

	Incumbents Amount	N=202 Percent	Non-incumbents Amount	N=42 Percent
Individuals giving \$50 or less	774,098	17.9	797,760	23.4
Individuals giving \$50.01 to \$250	994,060	22.9	531,755	15.6
Individuals giving over \$250	264,343	6.1	277,867	8.2
Candidates and immediate family	213,069	4.9	729,048	21.4
Political Action Committees (PACs)	1,589,486	36.7	525,044	15.4
Party Committees	247,874	5.7	415,994	12.2
Miscellaneous	253,913	5.9	130,366	3.8
Total	4,336,843	100.1	3,407,834	100.0
Average	21,470		7,962	

Table 7 summarizes the differences between incumbents and non-incumbents. Separate analysis of House and Senate candidates revealed essentially the same patterns reflected in the combined totals in Table 7. PACs strongly favored both Senate and House incumbents over non-incumbents, and non-incumbents drew far more heavily on family and personal wealth. The only difference large enough to warrant mention was the greater reliance of House candidates on contributions of \$50 or less (21.4 percent and 25.9 percent for House incumbents and non-incumbents respectively) compared to the Senate (10.5 percent and 17.0 percent), and a concomitant heavier reliance by Senate incumbents and non-incumbents on individual contributions in the \$50.01 to \$250 range.

Note that the totals reported in Table 7 conceal two important facts: the number of incumbents and non-incumbents, reported receiving virtually no money. The first point demonstrates the need to examine the average received from each source. The second suggests that even averages can be misleading when they are lowered by the inclusion of candidates who ran futile, unserious campaigns that attracted no money.

Table 8 seeks to account for these complications by comparing the average contributions by source to incumbents and non-incumbents (column 1) and the average contribution for just those candidates who received any money (column 2) for the House of Representatives. For example, PACs gave \$1,112,218 to the 181 incumbents, for an average of \$6,145; for the 385 non-incumbents, \$585,079 was given, for an average of \$944. In absolute terms, incumbents received 3.06 times as much money as a group than non-incumbents (this ratio is presented in the last column of Table 8). But the ratio of the average contribution (\$6,145/\$944) listed in column 1 is 6.51 to 1, because the total given to non-incumbents was divided among more candidates. However, in practice, PACs selected very carefully to which non-incumbents they would give. In fact, only 175 of the 385 House non-incumbents received any money whatsoever from any political action committee. Thus, the average given by PACs when they gave anything (\$2,076) was considerably higher than the group average of \$944. This average is compared to the average given to those incumbents

who got any PAC money in column 2 (3.10). Interestingly, 173 of the 181 incumbents (96 percent) got PAC money, so their average contribution changed little (from \$6,145 to \$6,429). The fact that nearly every incumbent received some PAC money is noteworthy itself, so the percentage of incumbents and non-incumbents who reported getting any money from the categories listed in the rows of Table 8 are presented in columns 3 and 4.

Table 8 suggests that no matter how the figures are calculated, PACs heavily favor incumbents. As column two's entry suggests, even if we look at the average given to just those candidates who got money, PACs gave \$3.10 to an incumbent for every dollar given to a non-incumbent. Several other interesting findings emerge from Table 8. Only 35 percent of incumbents gave to their own campaign or enticed family members to do so; 63 percent of non-incumbents did. This is the only category of contributor in Table 8 for which the proportion of non-incumbents receiving funds is higher than for incumbents. Though a higher proportion of incumbents received some party funds (77 percent versus 37 percent), the average amount of those contributions favored non-incumbents, the only instance in which non-incumbents were so advantaged.

Some significant conclusions about the fate of non-incumbents can be drawn from the analysis. First, they receive much less money than do incumbents. Second, interests with money to contribute support incumbents much more heavily, as reflected in the higher proportion of money from PACs (and the slightly lower dependence on small individual contributions). Third, non-incumbents must rely on personal sources of funds, support from party committees, and (to some extent) small contributions of \$50 or less. PACs generally avoid non-incumbents, and when they do contribute to them, they give substantially less. Finally, non-incumbents' chances for success are slim when they challenge an incumbent.

An analysis comparing the sources of contributions (primary and general election figures combined) to winning and losing candidates for the House and for the Senate reveals patterns very much like those contrasting incumbents and non-

Table 8
 Ratios of Average Contributions to Incumbents versus Non-incumbents by Sources of Contributions,
 1982 Pennsylvania House Election

	Ratio* of Average For All Candidates Incumbent/Non- incumbent	Ratio of Average For Candidates Who Got Any Money: Incumbent/Non- incumbent	Percent Who Got Any Money		Ratio of Total Sum Contributed: Incumbent/ Non-incumbent
			Incum- bent	Non- incumbent	
Individuals giving \$50 or less	2.08	1.69	94	76	0.98
Individuals giving \$50.01 to \$250	3.33	2.57	97	75	1.57
Individuals giving over \$250	1.80	0.97	54	29	0.85
Candidate and immediate family	0.57	1.03	35	63	0.27
Political Action Committees (PACs)	6.51	3.10	96	45	3.06
Party Committees	1.27	0.61	77	37	0.60
Miscellaneous	4.03	#	#	#	1.89

#Cannot be calculated since this category combines four separate categories.

*Ratio calculated by dividing average contributions received by incumbents by non-incumbents' averages. For example, incumbents got \$2.08 on average from contributions of \$50 or less to every \$1 non-incumbents

incumbents. This is not surprising, of course, since there is substantial overlap between being an incumbent and winning. Winners outspent losers about two to one in House races and two and a half to one in Senate races. Winners in both chambers got over one-third of their money from PACs; losers got 16.2 percent and 10.6 percent in House and Senate races respectively. One-fourth of Senate losers' money came from their own or family's pockets; for House losers, the figure was one-fifth. Because these patterns so closely resemble those found for incumbents and non-incumbents, no tables are presented here.

PATTERNS OF PAC CONTRIBUTIONS

Political Action Committees constitute the single largest source of funds to legislative candidates. Their relative importance to winners and to incumbents (who, as Table 7 shows, received over 36% of their funds from PACs) is even greater. The questions that have been raised about the motivations of PACs for contributing and the impact their largesse has on Congressional elections should be asked with equal persistence at the state level, especially given the recent expansion of national PAC participation in financing state elections referred to earlier.

The analysis of Pennsylvania's 1982 legislative elections permits examination of some of the important questions raised about PAC contributions. Some of these data provide more detail in describing the nature of PAC contributions. What sectors of society are represented by PACs who contribute to legislative races? How are their contributions related to whether a candidate is a Democrat or Republican, an incumbent or non-incumbent, or an eventual winner or loser? But some can take us beyond description to provide a basis for making inferences concerning the strategies PACs pursue. Do PACs differ in their participation in primary versus general election contests? Do some focus more on the Senate than the House? Is there interaction between party and incumbency? Finally, what is the relationship between the margin of victory or defeat and PAC contributions, and what does this

relationship suggest about the strategies pursued? Each of these questions will be examined below.

The Identity of PACs Contributing to Legislative Races in 1982

Classifying the nature of the interests represented by the PACs who gave to legislative candidates in 1982 requires playing an intriguing and often frustrating game of "name that PAC". It is not immediately obvious, for example, that the "Edward Douglass White PAC" and the "Marshall PAC" are both law firm PACs, or that they both are funded by attorneys from the same law firm.⁶ Unless you have an unusually deep knowledge of Pennsylvania businesses, you are unlikely to know how to classify the "Pitcairn PAC". Consequently, the classification of PACs is incomplete (as evidenced by the "miscellaneous" category) and undoubtedly includes some invalid assignments. The analysis reported here will utilize five broad categories: BUSINESS, PROFESSIONAL, LABOR, IDEOLOGICAL, and MISCELLANEOUS.

Figure 1 depicts how much each of the five PAC categories contributed to the \$2.1 million total given to legislative candidates in 1982. Business PACs clearly dominated, accounting for almost as much as the next two largest categories. Ideological PACs' contributions are barely visible. In examining the patterns of PAC contributions, the fundamental fact that ideological PACs (two-thirds of whose money came from women's groups) gave only 3.2% of all PAC money should be kept in mind.

Table 9, which includes Table 9A-9D, displays differences in how PACs apportion their contributions. Overall, neither party's candidates suffer a disadvantage when it comes to PAC giving (Table 9A). In fact, they split PAC receipts evenly. But substantial and predictable differences emerge in the choices of the PACs in each category. Business gave only 35% of its money to Democrats; labor gave Republicans but 16.5% of its funds. Ideological PACs distributed their limited funds three to one in favor of Democrats. Professional PACs, however, gave equally to both parties, and miscellaneous PACs nearly did so.

DISTRIBUTION OF PAC CONTRIBUTIONS BY CATEGORY,
1982 PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS




FIGURE 1

Table 9
 Contributions of PACs by Category of PAC in Pennsylvania's 1982 Legislative Election by:
 Party; Chamber; Incumbency; and Primary vs. General Election

	All PACs Combined		Business PACs		Professional PACs		Labor PACs		Ideological PACs		Miscellaneous PACs	
	amount	percent	amount	percent	amount	percent	amount	percent	amount	percent	amount	percent
Table 9A: Party												
Democrats	1,075,385	50.9	319,249	35.3	238,820	49.7	388,025	83.5	40,440	74.2	88,861	41.9
Republicans	1,039,135	49.1	584,096	64.7	241,530	50.3	76,485	16.5	14,025	25.8	122,999	58.1
Table 9B: Chamber												
House	1,475,501	69.8	614,472	68.0	332,775	69.3	329,945	71.0	47,040	86.4	151,269	71.4
Senate	639,029	30.2	288,873	32.0	147,575	30.7	134,565	29.0	7,425	13.6	60,591	28.6
Table 9C: Incumbency												
Incumbents	1,589,486	75.2	717,172	79.4	410,200	85.4	284,374	61.2	15,875	29.9	161,865	76.4
Non-incumbents	525,044	24.8	186,173	20.5	70,150	14.6	180,136	38.8	38,590	70.9	49,995	23.6
Table 9D: Election												
Primary	714,766	33.8	289,743	32.1	166,835	34.7	153,442	33.0	13,725	25.2	91,021	43.0
General	1,399,764	66.2	613,602	67.9	313,515	65.3	311,068	67.0	40,740	74.8	120,839	57.0

Table 10
 Average PAC Contribution to Candidates Who Received Any PAC Money by Party And Incumbency,
 1982 Pennsylvania House Election: Primary and General Combined


	All PACs Combined		Business PACs		Professional PACs		Labor PACs		Ideological PACs		Miscellaneous PACs		Party Committees	
	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N
Democratic Incumbents	6189	(83)	1947	(81)	1656	(83)	1947	(82)	395	(15)	791	(67)	998	(67)
Republican Incumbents	6650	(90)	3678	(89)	1708	(89)	702	(67)	180	(29)	786	(85)	1427	(72)
Democratic Non-Incumbents	1961	(106)	1196	(32)	766	(29)	1193	(91)	1237	(24)	334	(27)	1302	(85)
Republican Non-Incumbents	2253	(69)	1860	(27)	781	(27)	384	(38)	413	(15)	641	(35)	3032	(57)

Although Table 10 presents average contributions, not totals, the basic patterns of all PAC contributions are the same. Democratic House candidates received as much as Republicans, and incumbents got far more than non-incumbents. The 106 non-incumbent Democrats who received any PAC money got an average of \$1,961; 83 incumbents averaged \$6,189. For Republicans, the comparable figures are \$2,253 to 69 non-incumbents and \$6,650 to 90 incumbents. It is worth noting that nearly all incumbents regardless of party, received some PAC money; a much smaller proportion of non-incumbents did so. Figure 2 presents these data in a bar graph.

The three largest categories of PACs (business, professional, and labor) maintained the disparity between incumbents and non-incumbents, but treated Republicans and Democrats very differently. Business PACs concentrated their money on incumbents, and gave the strong edge to Republicans (\$3,678 to \$1,947). Although they gave much less to non-incumbents, they still favored Republicans, but by a lesser margin. By contrast, labor favored Democrats even more strongly than business PACs favored Republicans. Democratic incumbents received an average of \$1,947 to \$702 for GOP incumbents; for non-incumbents, the figures are \$1,193 and \$304. Labor was only able to match the average contribution that business PACs gave to incumbent Democrats. In other words, Democratic incumbents received as much on average from business PACs as they did from labor PACs. But business PACs overwhelmed labor's contributions to Republicans \$3,678 to \$702.

PACs representing the professions displayed remarkable non-partisanship in their giving. Their motto appears to have been: "Democrats and Republicans are equal, but incumbents are more equal than non-incumbents." Incumbents received well over twice as much as non-incumbents, and the total given (as Table 9 showed) differed even more.

AVERAGE PAC AND PARTY COMMITTEE CONTRIBUTIONS
BY PARTY AND INCUMBENCY



- ▨ DEMOCRATIC INCUMBENTS
- ▩ REPUBLICAN INCUMBENTS
- ▧ DEM NON-INCUMBENTS
- GOP NON-INCUMBENTS

FIGURE 2

Ideological PACs departed radically from the other categories by giving more to non-incumbents than incumbents. The number of candidates supported and the total given are modest. But the sharp break from the typical pattern suggests a fundamentally different strategy.

Table 10 also lists the average contribution made by all political committees associated with a political party. Party committees contributed less to incumbents than to non-incumbents, and supported more non-incumbents than did PACs. These differences between PACs and party committees anticipate the even sharper contrast discussed in the following section.

Table 11 duplicates the data in Table 10 for Senate candidates. Although many of the basic patterns in contributions to House candidates reported in Table 10 appear in Table 11 as well, several differences warrant attention. Business PAC favoritism toward Republican incumbents is less pronounced in the Senate. The ratio of average contributions by business to House GOP versus Democratic incumbents is 1.89 to 1 (\$3,678/\$1,947); for the Senate, it is 1.38 to 1 (\$12,715/\$9,223). Labor PACs, however, adopted the opposite strategy. They favor Democratic Senate incumbents more strongly than GOP incumbents (\$6,451/\$1,461, or 4.42 to 1) than in the House (\$1,947/\$702, or 2.77 to 1). Professional PACs treat Senate incumbents in both parties equally as they did with House incumbents. But they favor GOP non-incumbents over Democrats.

The distribution of party committee funds in Senate races contrasts with the House patterns in several notable ways. Democratic party committees poured resources into non-incumbent Senate candidates' campaigns, favoring them over incumbents by a ratio of 3.13 to 1 (\$5203/\$1660) compared to 1.30 to 1 in the House (\$1302/\$998). Republican party committees pursued the reverse strategy, actually giving more on average to incumbents than non-incumbents. This is not only reversed the Democrats' strategy, but contrasted with GOP party committee contributions to House candidates.

Table 1
 Average PAC Contribution to Candidates Who Received Any PAC Money by Party And Incumbency,
 1982 Pennsylvania Senate Election: Primary and General Combined

	All PACs Combined		Business PACs		Professional PACs		Labor PACs		Ideological PACs		Miscellaneous PACs		Party Committees	
	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N
Democratic Incumbents	23299	(10)	9223	(10)	5719	(10)	6451	(10)	908	(3)	1634	(10)	1660	(10)
Republican Incumbents	22208	(11)	12715	(11)	5776	(11)	1461	(9)	667	(3)	2339	(11)	6853	(9)
Democratic Non-Incumbents	6716	(18)	2588	(12)	2750	(8)	3247	(17)	2100	(1)	1053	(10)	5203	(17)
Republican Non-Incumbents	5109	(8)	4288	(6)	1213	(4)	567	(3)	300	(1)	1600	(5)	5419	(8)

Finally, labor PACs came out substantially behind business PACs in their total contributions to incumbent Senate Democrats. Table 10 showed that House Democratic incumbents received as much on average from labor as from business PACs. But incumbent Democratic Senators actually received an average of \$2,772 MORE from business than from labor PACs (\$9,223 versus \$6,451). Of course, Republican incumbents received far more from business PACs (\$12,715) than from labor PACs (\$1,461).

Vote Margins and Contributions: PACs Versus Party Committees

Controversy surrounds the question of why Political Action Committees make political contributions and what effect such donations have on the political process. Because the answers to these questions themselves become ammunition for the participants in the debate over PACs, the public explanations offered by PACs must be discounted. Furthermore, generalizations about PAC behavior can always be challenged by citing specific counter-examples. Because a rich diversity of motives produces contributions, such counter-examples can always be found. Consequently, conclusive evidence about motives is unlikely to ever surface. There will be no "smoking gun."

Some inferences about motives can be made on the basis of patterns of contributions. Specifically, contribution patterns can be examined to help choose between two contrasting explanations for PACs' campaign contributions. The first, typically offered by PAC spokesmen and their academic and elected supporters, asserts contributions are made to assure the candidates favorably disposed to the interest represented by the PAC get elected. The strategy pursued according to this view is to maximize the number of favorably inclined officials elected. This strategy is presented as falling within the mainstream of the theory and practice of pluralist democracy. The second, presented by public affairs lobbying groups, public officials critical of PACs and their academic supporters, maintains that PACs seek at a minimum to purchase access, and beyond that to actually purchase influence. In their view, PACs are not so much interested in maximizing the number of

favorably disposed candidates elected, but rather seek to assure that those who are elected will be favorably disposed. For these critics, this subtle distinction is critical. It leads them to regard PACs not as in the mainstream of pluralist democracy, but as posing a serious threat through their power to purchase access and influence due to superior financial resources available to the organized and wealthy interests they represent. This view of PACs' motives identifies their basic strategy as trying to maximize influence.

To state the obvious conclusion that the truth lies somewhere between these extremes really contributes little to our understanding. Where between the competing explanations does it lie? How might the strategies PACs pursue vary by jurisdiction or by the broad interests (for example, business or labor) represented by PACs? The data available in this study offer an opportunity to make some inferences about which explanation of PAC strategy best explains PAC contributions to Pennsylvania's 1982 legislative elections.

The analysis rests on comparing PAC contributions with political party contributions made during the general election campaign period, depending on how close the election was. Only general election contributions and outcomes can be utilized since contributions made during the primary often anticipate the general election contest.

Party committees are hypothesized to pursue the first strategy, that is, maximizing the number of the party's candidates elected. It made particular sense for party committees to adopt this strategy in Pennsylvania since control of both houses of the legislature hung in the balance in 1982. To implement such a strategy, one allocates more money to the closer races. It is irrational to squander scarce campaign funds on a sure winner or certain loser. The data presented below show that in fact party committees pursue the first strategy.⁸ The patterns of contributions made by party committees thus provide a standard against which one can assess PAC contribution strategies. To the extent PACs match the pattern of party contributions by closeness of the election, we can infer they pursue the first strategy; to the extent they do not, we

can assume they are adopting the second (access and influence maximizing) strategy.

Each general election candidate was placed in one of the five categories of the "MARGIN" variable introduced in Table 3. Candidates placed in each of the five categories received the following percentage of the vote: category 1 "close"--45% to 55%; category 2 "competitive"--56% to 60% or 40% to 44%; category 3 "safe"--61% to 70% or 30% to 39%; category 4 "assured"--71% to 99% or 1% to 29%; and category 5 "unopposed." Of course, the level of campaign spending helps determine the margin of victory. But the categories of vote margin are so broad that the problem of "circularity" (that candidates win by such large margins BECAUSE and only because they got so much money) is not a serious one. Campaign expenditures in relatively low visibility legislative races cannot ordinarily produce significant variation in votes obtained. Any candidate who wins by more than 70% of the vote comes into the contest with such an advantage that the amounts spent are unlikely to affect the outcome substantially, and both PACs and party committees are likely to know it. The fact that party committees allocate little money to such candidates confirms this line of argument.

Table 12 summarizes the relationship between vote margin and political party committee contributions. The pattern is clear and strong. Party committees direct their funds to candidates in the first two categories--that is, candidates who received between 40% and 60% of the vote. In absolute dollars, 63% of party funds given to House general election candidates, and 89% given to Senate candidates went to those in these first two categories. By contrast, these candidates received 46% and 54% respectively of the contributions given to all candidates from all sources.

The patterns of PAC contributions contrast sharply with party committees'. PACs gave only 40% of their contributions to House candidates and 48% to Senate candidates in close or competitive races. Tables 13 and 14 break down contributions to candidates for the House and Senate in each of the five ranges of vote margin by PAC category. The "drop off" in average contributions as races become less close is much less

Table 12
Party Committee Contributions by Vote Margin in
1982 Pennsylvania General Election Legislative Races

Vote margin	House Candidates*		Senate Candidates*	
	average contribution	(N)	average contribution	(N)
1. Close	3152	(41)	10076	(10)
2. Competitive	2308	(56)	9587	(4)
3. Safe	1109	(97)	1925	(21)
4. Assured	650	(65)	2200	(3)
5. Unopposed	489	(9)	0	(0)
Total All Candidates	1540	(268)	4898	(38)

*Average computed just for candidates who received any party committee money.

Table 13
 Contributions* of PACs by type of PAC to 1982 Pennsylvania House
 General Election Candidates According to Vote Margin

	All PACs Combined		Business PACs		Professional PACs		Labor PACs		Ideological PACs		Miscellaneous PACs		Party Committees	
	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N
Close	4180	(40)	2600	(28)	927	(27)	996	(38)	564	(10)	803	(32)	3152	(41)
Competitive	4198	(58)	2224	(44)	1061	(36)	1233	(53)	1058	(21)	751	(34)	2308	(56)
Safe	3332	(97)	2111	(69)	1285	(63)	794	(79)	255	(22)	398	(47)	1109	(97)
Assured	3176	(71)	1638	(56)	1114	(59)	616	(58)	164	(14)	352	(33)	650	(65)
Unopposed	2314	(25)	1059	(25)	765	(24)	391	(15)	200	(1)	239	(19)	489	(9)
Average All Races	3496	(291)	1960	(223)	1092	(209)	946	(243)	529	(68)	522	(165)	1540	(268)

*Only contributions made during the general election period are included in the figures presented in this table. Candidates may have received PAC contributions in the Primary.

Table 14
 Contributions* of PACs by type of PAC to 1982 Pennsylvania Senate
 General Election Candidates According to Vote Margin

	All PACs Combined		Business PACs		Professional PACs		Labor PACs		Ideological PACs		Miscellaneous PACs		Party Committees	
	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N	average	N
Close	12697	(10)	8637	(8)	2860	(7)	1991	(10)	750	(1)	1911	(9)	10076	(10)
Competitive	13750	(4)	6108	(3)	3183	(3)	9050	(2)	781	(4)	1475	(4)	9587	(4)
Safe	7712	(20)	4465	(16)	3321	(12)	1871	(17)	300	(3)	854	(12)	1925	(21)
Assured	7436	(4)	3044	(4)	2850	(4)	1733	(3)	0	(0)	243	(4)	2200	(3)
Unopposed	5525	(2)	1700	(2)	1675	(2)	2050	(2)	0	(0)	200	(1)	0	(0)
Average All Races	9425	(40)	5286	(33)	3006	(28)	2327	(34)	597	(8)	1151	(30)	4898	(38)

* Only contributions made during the general election period are included in the figures presented in this table. Candidates may have received PAC contributions in the Primary.

steep than for party committees. Figure 3 depicts the difference in the rate of decline for House candidates. As Tables 13 and 14 show, the average PAC contribution received by candidates in the second ("competitive") category is actually slightly more than given to those in "close" races (category 1); the difference in average contribution given to candidates in categories 3 and 4 is very small.

Some differences emerged in the strategies the individual categories of PACs employed. Figure 4 depicts the differences in the contributions made to House candidates by PACs associated with business, labor, and the professions. Professional PACs exhibit virtually no concern for the closeness of the race when making contributions, with the exception of unopposed candidates. And even they, though absolutely assured of victory shy of intervention by the grim reaper, received an average of \$765, not much below the \$927 average given to candidates who just barely won or lost by a 5% margin!

The contrasting strategies pursued by PACs and party committees can be illustrated by examining the proportion of all funds candidates in each of the five categories of vote margin received from all PACs and all party committees. As Table 5 reveals, PACs accounted for about 27% of all receipts and party committees for a little less than 9%. But because party committees concentrate their limited funds in the closest contests, they provide one fifth of all receipts in "close" races compared to one-quarter provided by PACs. The proportion of funds each provides diverges increasingly without exception in House races as the contest becomes less competitive. Figure 5 presents this pattern graphically. The pattern in the Senate (see Figure 6) is similar.

Party committees abandon candidates virtually certain to win or lose. PACs provide an increasingly large share of the (albeit diminishing) sums big winners receive.⁹ Contributions to unopposed candidates provide the most dramatic evidence for the proposition that as a group, PACs pursue the second strategy. The two unopposed Senate candidates received an average of \$5,525 from PACs; party committees give them nothing. The 25 unopposed House candidates all received some

PAC money, and they averaged over \$2,300; just nine of them received contributions from party committees, and they averaged a modest \$489.




FIGURE 3

* BASED ON TABLE 13

BUSINESS, PROFESSIONAL AND LABOR PAC CONTRIBUTIONS
 BY VOTE MARGIN 1982 PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE GENERAL ELECTION





FIGURE 4

* BASED ON TABLE 13

PROPORTION OF ALL RECEIPTS FROM ALL PACS
AND PARTY COMMITTEES BY VOTE MARGIN 1982 HOUSE GENERAL ELECTION





FIGURE 5

PROPORTION OF ALL RECEIPTS FROM ALL PACS
AND PARTY COMMITTEES BY VOTE MARGIN 1982 SENATE GENERAL
ELECTION



✕ ALL PACS
 ✕ PARTY COMMITTEES

FIGURE 6

CONCLUSIONS

Much analysis remains if we are to fully exploit the potential of these data. Multiple regression to predict total contributions, PAC contributions, and party committee contributions using margin, incumbency, chamber, and party, for example, can be performed with little difficulty. Once information of incumbents' committee assignments and roll call voting behavior are added to the data set, many other interesting lines of analysis can be pursued.

However, the limited analysis reported here reveals much about legislative campaign finance in Pennsylvania. I will not summarize the many findings already presented, but rather conclude with some observations on what is perhaps the most significant and timely question -- the nature and role of Political Action Committee contributions.

First, it is clear that PACs play a prominent role in financing these elections, rivaling and even exceeding their participation levels in financing Congressional elections. Over 25% of the nearly \$7,750,000 raised for the 1982 legislative elections came from PACs. More significantly, PACs accounted for almost 37% of incumbents' receipts. They gave general election winners in the House 36% of all money raised; for the Senate, it was 34.8%.

Second, as a group, PACs appear to pursue a strategy of seeking to win access and influence rather than maximizing the number of favorably disposed candidates who win. Unlike party committees, PACs show little inclination to concentrate their contributions where additional funds are likely to have the greatest impact -- in the close elections. Rather, much of their money goes to candidates who would have won handily anyway. Apparently, they seek to favorably dispose winners to their entreaties.

Third, important differences emerge in the strategies different categories of PACs pursue. Ideological PACs resemble party committees, giving their money to those with the best chance of winning and caring little for supporting incumbents or winners. But the limited funds available to such

PACs are insufficient to shift the pattern for all PACs combined. Professional PACs appear especially eager to gain access and influence. They divide their money evenly among Republicans and Democrats, favor incumbents heavily, and barely adjust contributions according to the closeness of the election.

Finally, to the extent labor PACs have acquired a reputation for being "heavy hitters" who provide countervailing resources to those of business PACs, the reputation is ill-deserved. Business PACs contribute substantially more than labor PACs overall. They match labor's contributions to House incumbent Democrats and actually give more to Democratic incumbent Senators than does labor.

NOTES

¹The 1978 total given by Jaffe is \$21 million.

²Jaffe (1983) reports total spending in Michigan in 1982 as \$8.0 million (compared to \$3.8 million in 1980); in New Jersey, 1981's election saw \$8.0 in expenditures (versus \$4.0 million in 1977); Illinois spent \$30.00 million in 1982, a 50% jump over 1978's 24.0 million.

³Political scientist Ruth Jones told Jaffe (1983): "Companies are finding that they now have to pay close attention to regulations at the state level, particularly since you are seeing more deregulation at the federal level."

⁴Some candidates failed to file the reports required by law and were referred by the Bureau of Elections to the Attorney General for prosecution. These candidates typically got very few votes and in all likelihood spent little or no money. The absence of data on their receipts and expenditures hardly affects the results reported here.

⁵It is interesting to note that candidates for Governor in 1982 received even less grass roots financial support. Only 8% of the total both candidates raised came in amounts of \$50 or less (based on unpublished research by the author).

⁶The firm is Schnader, Harrison, et.al. The Bureau of Elections list of Political Committees dated 7/21/83 only gives an address and treasurer's name for these PACs. The address and identity of the treasurer are identical for both PACs, but there is no obvious way of detecting this given the fact that over 1000 political committees appear on the list.

⁷For example, those unopposed in the primary nonetheless receive some money from supporters who anticipate a strongly contested general election. Thus, contributions to unopposed primary candidates are not necessarily irrational or wasted when made by someone pursuing the first strategy (maximizing the number of favorably disposed legislators elected).

⁸The use of ALL party committee contributions weakens the purity of the assumption since local party committees often provide support to local "sacrificial lambs" whereas legislative campaign committees do not. The House Democratic and Republican campaign committees, for example, gave \$274,000 to candidates in the general election, 66% of the total from all party committees. Over two-thirds of this \$274,000 went to candidates who received from 40% to 60% of the vote. All other party committees gave exactly one-half of their money to such candidates. Thus, the following analysis, which combines all party contributions, is conservative. Differences in party and PAC contribution patterns would have been even sharper had only the House and Senate party campaign committees' contributions been analyzed.

⁹Though the data have not been presented, PACs conform to what logic suggests in allocating funds between "big winners" and "big losers." Theoretically, the PAC contributions to candidates in category 4 could have gone to losers who got 1% to 29% of the vote. But 84% of all PAC contributions went to winners in the general election, and some of the 16% that general election losers got came in the form of primary contributions. Party committees, by contrast, gave exactly 50% of their total contributions to general election losers.

REFERENCES

- GILES, Michael W. and Anita Pritchard. (1983) "Expenditures and Elections in Florida." Paper delivered at the Southern Political Science Association.
- JAFFE, Mark. (1983) "Special-interest groups lead the way in campaign-spending 'arms race'." *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Oct. 23.
- ROTSTEIN, Gary. (1984a) "Stricter law on lobbyists' spending sought." *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, Jan. 25.
- _____(1984b) "Lobbyists' role on state lawmaking grows." *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, Jan. 24.
- TURNER, Wallace. (1984) "Campaign Spending is Issue on Coast." *The New York Times*, Feb. 2.