Idealism, Realism, and the Categorical Imperative in Kant's *Perpetual Peace*

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Immanuel Kant's philosophical system is devoted to reconciling the "antinomy" between freedom and determination. In Perpetual Peace, *this becomes the related antinomy between morality and politics. This article reinterprets Kant's political essays as efforts to reconcile the modern dichotomy in international politics between idealism and realism. Kant's application of his famous moral rule, the categorical imperative, to the problem of war and peace captures the tension between these contradictory approaches to international relations. The reconciliation he achieves allows contemporary practitioners to be guardedly hopeful in their peacemaking efforts. Proponents of the "democratic peace" thesis, which Kant originated, would do well to control their enthusiasm; yet critics should contain their cynicism.*

This article understands Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace*[1] as a philosophical and practical application of the classic dichotomy between political idealism and political realism in international relations.[2] Philosophically, Kant defines and seeks to mediate the seeming contradiction between politics and morality through the application of several formulations of his *categorical imperative.* In so doing, he insists upon hopefulness about the prospects for morality, and peace in particular, while also warning that hope must not give rise to paralyzing illusions about the facts of political life. In his prescriptions for international political practice, Kant draws upon history, political science, and political logic to evaluate the philosophical worthiness of familiar types of political action. The result of these efforts is an essay that weaves together close analyses of the virtues, vices, and inextricable linkages between realism and idealism in politics.

Kant's political thought is a product of his overall philosophical system.[3] In the *Critique of Pure Reason,*[4] Kant declares a Copernican revolution in epistemology, in accordance with which he asks "whether we may not have more success ... if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge" (Kant 1929, Bxvi). In other words, what we count as knowledge consists of the systematic ordering by the categories of the understanding of empirical and conceptual intuitions. This process of ordering is revolutionary because it means that we construct our knowledge and experience rather than have them given to us. The Kantian project is to examine and understand the rules of construction and to turn away from any effort to know things in themselves. Kant thus un-

dertakes to make explicit the limits of knowing and the possibilities for action possessed by rational beings (Kant 1929, Bxxx).

When presented with the results of the understanding's ordering of the data of empirical and conceptual experience, the faculty of pure reason seeks to provide a single organizational scheme for all we know. Reason determines, however, that neither causality nor freedom can be affirmed or denied as the controlling principle of what we call experience. Kant's solution to this "antinomy of reason" is the adoption of a critical standpoint from which reason is constantly checking these tendencies. Reason's knowledge of itself therefore becomes as important as its knowledge of experience. As a result, "the doctrine of morality [freedom] and the doctrine of nature [causality] may each ... make good its position ... in so far as criticism has previously established our unavoidable ignorance of things in themselves" (Kant 1929, Bxxix; also see A807/B835).[5] Kant's understanding of political experience in general and of war and peace in particular can be extrapolated from this epistemological dualism.

For Kant, political experience, like all experience, is best understood as the systematic ordering of empirical and conceptual intuitions by the categories of the understanding. Reason's efforts to find a single organizational scheme by which to explain political experience spark its interest in questions of war and peace. When the understanding apprehends all of the attendant suffering, death, and deprivation of war, it considers these as no more or less natural phenomena than the passing of a ship (Kant 1929, A192/B237). Rather than accept the phenomena of war with resignation, reason seeks to locate war within the causal chain, regarding it as both cause and effect.

Regarding war as effect, reason explores such causes as human nature, the nation-state, and the whole of the state system until, considering these also as effects, it comes to seek a final original cause. Because of its "ignorance of things-in-themselves," however, reason cannot identify such a cause with certainty. Unable to confirm or deny the necessity of war, reason therefore considers the possibility that war is not necessitated by nature (Kant 1929, Bxxiii; Kant 1957, 36, AA 371).

Reason determines that it must think war unnecessary when it considers war not as effect but as cause. First, reason will come to recognize that the attendant deprivations of war, such as fear, hunger, military occupation, economic collapse, and death, would obstruct reason in its efforts to attain knowledge of nature. Reason is essentially rendered impotent by war. Second, since reason is unable ultimately to complete the determination of human beings in the causal chain, it must consider them as beings in possession of a self-determining will, that is, as ends in themselves. War thus has the additional consequence of obstructing human freedom. If humans are required always to act in response to the instru-

mentalities of war, they cannot also exercise freedom in pursuit of higher moral ends. Practical reason therefore is also rendered impotent.

Given these conclusions, the eradication of war becomes a moral imperative. Kant (1957, 18, AA 356) insists that reason, "from its throne of supreme moral legislating authority, absolutely condemns war as a legal recourse and makes peace a direct duty." Elsewhere he writes, "morally practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible veto: There is to be no war" (Kant 1991, 160, AA 354, emphasis in the original). But while war's eradication is an imperative whose possibility is enhanced by our inability to affirm the necessity of war, its achievement is fraught with empirical obstacles. If the end is peace, the means must at least sometimes be war. This familiar dichotomy of peace and war makes manifest in the political realm the dichotomy between freedom and causality in epistemology. The resultant political antinomy of idealism and realism is also continuous with those of religion and science as well as those of autonomy and heteronomy. Each of the poles of these antinomies has the force of its own truth in the struggle between them. As with epistemological antinomies, a critical standpoint from which mediation can take place is required. In the various fields of human action, practical reason turns to the categorical imperative as that standpoint.

Although an extensive explication of the categorical imperative is beyond the scope of this article, a few brief remarks will help prepare for the analysis of Kant's application of it to the antinomy of idealism and realism in international politics. In the *Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant seeks a fundamental principle for moral choice universally applicable to all human situations (Sullivan 1989, 149; also see Kant 1956). As with critical reason in his epistemology, the categorical imperative and the procedures used to derive it are grounded in the limitations and possibilities of human practical reason, as Kant understood them. That is, we cannot know whether actions that contradict the categorical imperative would be appropriate for beings other than ourselves. To Kant, though, they are never appropriate for human beings.

In the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant articulates three formulations of the categorical imperative:

1. Universalizability: I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law (Kant 1959, 18, AA 402).
2. Mutual Respect: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end (Kant 1959, 47, AA 429).
3. Publicity: Never act in such a way that the maxim of your action could not be regarded as legitimate by all parties (Kant 1959, 47, AA 381).

This article argues that Kant's application of each of these formulations of the categorical imperative to questions of war and peace in Perpetual Peace mediates between the idea of peace and the realities of international politics.

I

In his poignantly ironic introduction to the essay, Kant (1957, 3, AA 343) says that his title is derived from "a satirical inscription [perpetual peace] on a Dutch innkeeper's sign upon which a burial ground was painted."[6] The image of the graveyard suggests that death is the only sort of perpetual peace likely to result from the failure to construct a careful balance of idealism and realism in politics. Realists, who tend to accept and even relish the inevitability of war, put themselves and the rest of humanity in the grave by applying only force and instrumental reason to conflict. Idealists neglect tactics and the verity of force in favor of some totalistic vision that lands themselves and humanity, again, in the grave. Whether in pursuing knowledge or peace, the uncritical use of reason, metaphorically, is death.

As F. H. Hinsley (1963, 69) notes, the structure of *Perpetual Peace* takes "the form of a treaty ... with a preliminary and definitive articles and a secret article. ... This tripartite structure includes, first, the conditions to be achieved; second, the measures necessary to achieve them; and third, the conditions under which it may be hoped that such measures will successfully be undertaken. Each of these parts of the essay describes political arrangements that derive from the structure of the understanding itself. We begin with the "Preliminary Articles."

The "Preliminary Articles" are a catalogue of the concepts constituting the relations between nations living under perpetual peace. They are summed up in the idea that the only peace reason can know and command is perpetual. A peace treaty is to be "the end of *all* hostilities" (Kant 1957, 4, AA 33, emphasis mine). To call the seeming peace of a truce or ceasefire perpetual is "a dubious pleonasm." As Hinsley (1963, 74) observes, "[w]hen Kant wrote peace, he meant peace" (emphasis mine). Despite the term "preliminary," these articles are not a list of actions whose outcome is to be peace. Rather, they describe those relationships between and among nations that for Kant are truly peaceful. Characterized by Hinsley (1963, 69) as "a statement of the law of nations as it ought to be," the Preliminary Articles insist upon mutual sovereign independence among nations while recognizing that their inherent competitiveness will drive them into conflict with each other. In the tradition of contract theory, Kant's Preliminary Articles are the terms to which he believed nations would agree if they wanted to coexist and compete peacefully.[7] They combine a genuine idealism in the commitment to peaceful coexistence

with a sensible realism that recognizes the strain that competitiveness presents. Any treaty whose terms fail to realize any of the Preliminary Articles will end in war and is, in fact, no treaty at all. All parties must agree at the outset that these are to be the outcome of their negotiations before they can even begin discussing the details of a treaty. The Preliminary Articles are the terms of international coexistence to which all nations would agree.

The six preliminary articles are divided into two parts, each consisting of three provisions. The first three preliminary articles grouped according to this division are:

1. "No treaty of peace shall be held valid in which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war" (Kant 1957, 3, AA 343).

2. "No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state" (Kant 1957, 7, AA 346).

3. "No state shall, during war, permit such acts of hostility which would make mutual confidence in the subsequent peace impossible: Such are the employment of assassins, poisoners, breach of capitulation, and incitement to treason in the opposing state" (Kant 1957, 7, AA 346).

These three articles express idealism's vision of a genuine peace. Further evidence that Kant understood them this way is found in his insistence that they "hold regardless of circumstances" and that they "demand prompt execution" if the peace is to be genuine (Kant 1957, 8, AA 347). Hence, these three articles are essential to the internal logic of treaties, requiring at a minimum that the genuine intent be to establish peace. Treaties that look to future battles and victories violate the categorical imperative's universalization requirement and are little more than veiled weapons of war (Gr 18, AA 402). Likewise, interventions in the affairs of other states are inconsistent with the mutual respect requirement of the categorical imperative (Gr 47, AA 429). Realist objections to such commitments and forbearance fail to recognize that insecurity in any part of the state system will undermine the security of all states.

If the resort to war is to be "annihilated by the treaty of peace," the parties to the treaty must be able to trust one another to abide by its terms (Kant 1957, 4, AA 343). Even in the midst of war, Kant (1957, 7, AA 346-347) argues, it must be assumed that an enemy will not be entirely without scruple. For realists such trust is little more than the "sweet dream" of the philosophers; idealism can nevertheless insist that untrustworthy actions contradict the categorical imperative and undermine a lasting peace (Kant 1957, 3, AA 343).

Kant's categorical imperative means that individual acts, whether of a person or a state, define for all actors the terms and boundaries of interaction. Just as the liar loses the short term advantage of lying by being told lies in turn, states that deceive to achieve victory in diplomacy or

conquest will themselves eventually be defeated by deception. Thus liars beget lying, cheaters beget cheating, and warriors beget war. This is not to say that all liars, cheaters, and warriors will receive their just deserts. Such a proposition could not be independently verified. For Kant, however, the very discussion of peace presupposes idealism's insistence on the centrality of trust among nations. Without it there will be a "war of extermination" permitting "perpetual peace only in the vast burial ground of the human race" (Kant 1957, 8, AA 347).

Kant focuses in these three articles on the centrality to war of the tendency to resolve conflicts with violence and the assumption that nations will disingenuously promise not to do so. By emphasizing the unreflective character of a thoroughgoing realism, he hints at its ultimate futility in politics. Realists, who can never see beyond the conflict at hand, are destined to perpetuate and deepen it. Peace treaties founded on exclusively realist assumptions about their meaning are not peace treaties at all.

The second set of "Preliminary Articles," which critiques idealism, makes the following points:

1. "No independent states, large or small, shall come under the domination of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation" (Kant 1957, 4, AA 344).

2. "Standing armies shall in time be totally abolished" (Kant 1957, 4, AA 345).

3. "National debts shall not be contracted with a view to the external friction of states" (Kant 1957, 6, AA 345).

If the first set of articles must hold immediately and "regardless of circumstances," this second set is not quite so constrained. Kant calls them "permissive laws" of pure reason. The substance of these three articles is unimportant to my analysis since they are not immediately to be enforced (Kant 1957, 9n, AA 348; also see Kant 1957, 37-38, AA 372). Each of these provisions, like those in the first set of articles, seeks to eliminate force as a tool of conflict resolution. Because peacemaking must occur in space and time, however, the mere assertion by idealists that peace is (or should be) at hand is insufficient to assure that it will remain so.[8]

The categorical imperative absolutely prohibits only those actions that would fundamentally undermine any hope of achieving peace. The second set of preliminary articles can remain unfulfilled without undermining the integrity of the immediate commitment to the first three articles. Nations will have to be prepared to endure the conditions of war until all can trust the sincerity of one another's commitment to peace. Realism, then, does not violate the universalization formulation of the categorical imperative by reserving the resort to arms as a threat to maintain the "preliminary" peace. It would be possible, without undermining the prospects for peace, for nations committed to establish-

ing peace to maintain standing armies long enough to ward off destabilizing developments. Nor does realism violate the mutual respect formulation: the maintenance of colonies treats other nations as means (objects) only in order eventually to treat them as ends. For Kant, the value of the categorical imperative lies not only in what it prohibits but also in what the relative formality of its terms permit. Just like criticism in epistemology, it must be applied carefully to each situation. The tragedy is that idealism fails to do so: in its enthusiasm for peace, the absence of realism's pragmatic patience invites aggression. Again, any treaty whose founding principles are overly idealistic is not a peace treaty at all.

For Kant, the "Preliminary Articles" contain those principles that reason requires as constitutive of a genuine peace. They detail the minimal conditions necessary for the flourishing of reason in a global political context. Kant also uses the Preliminary Articles to contrast the roles of realism and idealism in politics. Realists focus on instrumental tactics that undermine the fabric of trust essential to a lasting peace. In their zeal to achieve tactical success in the short term, they compel others to do likewise, thereby reinforcing the suspicions rather than the trust of all. Idealists also undermine their intended gains from the preliminary peace by acting unreflectively on the idea of trust. Their illusory confidence that other states are motivated either by good will or rational calculation to abstain from aggression leads to a complaisance destined to prompt the aggression of realists until they are all led to "the vast burial ground of the human race" (Kant 1957 8, AA 347).

Idealists and realists get carried away with themselves. Their obsession with their own internal principles leads them to unreflective and contradictory choices. Especially at critical junctures, both idealists and realists violate the categorical imperative's requirement that actions be universalizable. They unreflectively fall back on a rule of thumb rather than make a careful assessment of circumstances and consequences. Achievement of peace thus becomes a hopeless endeavor. Avoidance of war becomes a mere luxury afforded only by exhaustion or good luck.

Acceptance of war's inevitability is not an option for Kant. The attendant deprivations of war, such as fear, hunger, military expense, economic collapse, disease, and death would obstruct human achievement in knowledge and morality (Kant 1957 12, AA 351). The requisite collegiality and high cost of science cannot be sustained during wartime. Worse, war requires people to act in response to the instrumentalities of warfare. As such they cannot exercise their inherent freedom to obey the commands of the categorical imperative. These inhuman consequences of war compel reason to seek war's eradication, however quixotic that may appear to be.

The centrality of human freedom to Kant's entire philosophical system and the tendency of war to obliterate the possibility of freedom blur the distinction between idealism and realism in international politics. Idealism is prior and superior to realism in that it derives from the "commands (*leges praeceptivae*) and prohibitions (*leges prohibitivae*)" of pure reason. Realism, on the other hand, derives its authority from these commands and prohibitions. Idealism acts on the positive and negative obligations of what, in the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant calls "narrow" duties. Such duties as the command to end war or the prohibition against intervention in domestic disputes are absolute obligations. By contrast, realism can act only to create and maintain the conditions required for the fulfillment of narrow duties. Kant (1991, 65, 194, AA, 240, 390) refers to these obligations of realism as "wide" duties to distinguish them from narrow duties.[9] Whereas narrow duties are clear and stand alone, wide duties are derivative, contingent on the circumstances in which they are undertaken and bounded by the narrow duties that they are positively to achieve or negatively not to contradict. Because idealism always acts from narrow duties, often to a fault, realism is always taking its cue from the idealist. Yet, realism itself cannot set the standards of action. It can only act within the standards established by idealism. Narrow duties are the master of wide duties, and idealism is the master of realism.

The significance of this doctrine of the primacy of the ideal in Kant's essay warrants illustration. Imagine caricatures of the idealist and realist. In the political machinations that lead to the outbreak of war, the realist patiently, sometimes not so patiently, urges the idealist to make a show of strength, to distrust the enemy, and to beware of sinister plots and tactics. The idealist stalls for time in anticipation of a final and triumphant "peace is at hand" press conference. When the shooting starts, however, the realist orders the idealist aside. War is a military, not a moral enterprise, the realist will claim. With that much the idealist will agree, while reminding the realist that it is for peace, not perpetual war, that the realist's services are engaged. However virile the realist's posture, the *end of realism is peace, not merely victory.*

Just as the "intuitions" of the first Critique are "blind" without "concepts," so is the realist without the guidance of the idealist (Kant 1929, A 51/B 75). War is a non-moral activity. When a battlefield victory is achieved, the war is merely redefined, not ended. Neither the categorical imperative nor the logic of politics can accept the kind of peace that is achieved and maintained by force. Thus, while idealists do not always dominate the stage, they are always present in repeating the command, which defines the boundaries of a realist's choices: "There is to be no war" (Kant 1991, 160, AA 354). Like "empty concepts" that have no empirical referents, however, idealism must be wary of the illusion that because there is to be no war, there will be none.

II

We turn now to Kant's delineation of the means by which the Preliminary Articles are to be realized. In the "Definitive Articles for Perpetual Peace," Kant describes the practical steps necessary to the achievement of a perpetual peace. In formulating the means to this end, he again steers a critical course between idealism and realism by taking account of both the commands of morality and the empirical constraints imposed by politics (Kant 1957, 35, AA 370).

The "Definitive Articles" are introduced with the observation that "[t]he state of peace among men living side by side is not the natural state; the natural state is one of war. This does not always mean open hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war" (Kant 1957 10, AA 348-349). The establishment of peace, contrary to the skepticism of the realists, is both morally necessary and empirically possible. Contrary to the dogmatism of the idealists, however, peace must be established in the natural context and thus prudentially. This duty to establish a peace consistent with both the standards of morality and the constraints of nature leads Kant to conclude that it can be achieved only if relations among people are arranged as if it is their will to be at peace with one another. They need not actually will peace but merely do so externally (juridically) by conforming to laws that have them act as though they do. While political idealism is restricted to setting as ends the standard of human behavior, political realism must devise morally legitimate means, in nature, to accomplish it.

In view of these considerations, Kant (1957, 10n, AA 350) postulates that "[a]ll men who can reciprocally influence one another must stand under some civil constitution." That is, in order to assure the law-abiding behavior necessary to peace, humans must codify right conduct contractually. In all contracts, parties must agree on what their relations ought to be and then on those means of achieving them that are most consistent with the moral principles that require those relations. Peace rests upon security "against hostility ... pledged to each by his neighbor." Such pledges, however, "can occur only in a civil state"; otherwise, "each may treat his neighbor, from whom he demands this security, as an enemy" (Kant 1957, 10, AA 349). Peace thus requires the establishment of a constitutional context. Without this context, such pledges would be empty and could not effectuate the moral requirement for peace. Hence, idealism's optimistic faith in the effectiveness of mutual pledges of friendship is tempered by realism's cautioning on the need for sufficient civil authority to avoid the deterioration of pledges into empty promises. The specific means devised to achieve that security will differ among different societies as well as among different levels of political relations. Each of the three "Definitive Articles" describes that constitution (contract) consistent with these

requirements that would exist at three levels of political relationship: between individuals in a nation, between nations of the world, and between individuals considered as world citizens (Kant 1957, 10-11n, AA 350).

At the level of individuals in a nation, Kant offers the "First Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace," the idea that "The Civil Constitution of Every State Should be Republican." It is "[t]he only constitution which derives from the idea of the original compact, and on which all juridical legislation of a people must be based" (Kant 1957, 11, AA 350). Kant's enthusiasm for the republican form, which he defines as a separation of the executive and legislative powers, stems from the idea that republicanism takes the social contract seriously in acknowledging the principal role of the citizenry in constituting political societies. There can be no domestic peace without the contract, and there can be no contract without the participation of the entire society in its construction. The republican constitution, then, is founded upon the idealist notion that all government derives from the contractual consent of the governed.

Several implications for the treatment of citizens derive from this idealist foundation of the republican constitution. First, each person is entitled to a liberty consistent with that of other people. Without this principle, there could have been no consent, and no ongoing consent, to the social contract. Second, each person is to be subject to one common law, without which there could be no ground for agreement in conflicts. Finally, each person is to be exactly equal to every other person with respect both to the law and to responsibility. Without such equality, there could be no true contract because the stronger party would have dictated its terms to the weaker (Kant 1957, 12, AA 349-350).

Like others in the contract tradition, particularly Rousseau, Kant regards the will of the citizenry as the foundation of authority over it. Political authority is never exercised over people without their consent, even when they are passive or have never explicitly given it. In giving this consent, they commit themselves to a social rather than private existence. They become citizens. The categorical imperative's insistence on autonomy (liberty), universalizability (law), and respect for people (equality) is most closely approximated in the republic because it is by definition a society constituted by citizens. Consequently, republicanism "is the original basis of every form of civil constitution" (Kant 1957, 12, AA 351).

Although the fundamental idea behind the constitution is that it will establish a common law to which all consent and are equally subject, Kant is not suggesting that the citizens directly formulate that law in an empirical sense. The principal function of the law is to institute the conditions of peace. It must not be construed as an expression of collective self-interest. It is a law that expresses the "general will" of the people, to which they "would" consent (Kant 1957, 12n, AA 351). In other words,

the republic is not a direct democracy.

Democracy is "necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive in which all ... who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom" (Kant 1957, 14, AA 352). Direct democracy returns people to a state of war by placing sovereignty in the hands of the majority. Kant thus dismisses the idealist who might mistake him as saying that political legitimacy requires the empirical consent of people who, by nature, are self-interested. To the contrary, it requires the consent of reason as expressed by rational beings through the general will. With a nod toward the realists, Kant further observes that the law can be effective even in the conduct of "a race of devils," as long as the state is organized well and the citizens are intelligent enough to follow its incentives. Specifically,

> "the powers of each selfish inclination are so arranged in opposition that one moderates or destroys the ruinous effects of the other. The consequence for reason is the same as if none of [these inclinations] existed, and man is forced to be a good citizen even if not a morally good man." (Kant 1957, 30, AA 366)

Kant's republic, then, is governed *for* and *through* the people but not necessarily *by* them. It would be ruled by a preferably small number of representatives, either an aristocracy or a monarchy, who would frame laws that facilitate the orderly clash of interests. On the one hand, Kant's realism warns that the larger the number of rulers (such as collective monarchies, corporatist aristocracies, or representative democracies), he greater is the likely influence of self-interest (Kant 1957, 15, AA 353). On the other hand, realism also warns that however small the number of rulers, they might become just as despotic as democracies by ruling in their self-interest. Nevertheless, "it is at least possible for [aristocracies and monarchies] to assume a mode of government conforming to the spirit of a representative system," while it is impossible in democracies "since everyone wishes to be master" (Kant 1957, 14, AA 353). Idealism prevails in the insistence that a citizen's right to pursue self-interest is fundamental to the good constitution, whereas realism points away from democracy and is only guardedly optimistic about the republican potential of monarchy and aristocracy. Ultimately, the republican mode of government is to harness the selfish inclination against war.

The "Second Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace," that "The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free States," depends upon the first article. According to Kant, it is not only conflict among themselves as individuals that inclines people to form themselves into a state of ordered liberty. "Even if a people were not forced by internal discord to submit to public laws," he writes, "war would compel them to do so"

(Kant 1957, 29, AA 365). They will inevitably find themselves surrounded and threatened by individual states in the same way they are threatened by other individuals. The need to defend against this threat requires the formation of a state in which selfish inclinations can be prevented from interfering with collective self-defense. Domestic peace, albeit among "devils," is essential to international peace, which is likewise essential to the fruits of domestic peace. This continuum of domestic and international political order means that the two are not much different from each other and that idealism and realism will occupy the same positions in framing an international peace as they do at the domestic level.

According to Kant, citizens of republics will be disinclined to go to war because the true general will, expressed by citizens or their representatives, would not consent to a declaration of war. "[N]othing is more natural," he writes, than that people would be "very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war" (Kant 1957, 12, AA 351). Even if people are naturally inclined toward war when they are outside the state, they would not consent to it if their liberty under a republican constitution, if not their own morally developed individual wills, prohibits it (Kant 1957, 17, AA 355). The feature of republics that inclines them to peace thus lies in their constitution. A republic is a state in which the citizenry has a direct stake. Its existence is dependent upon their individual as well as collective wills and is at least implicitly formed and maintained by them for the sake of their liberty to pursue their particular interests. For Kant, the republican state has personality. Its citizens will only reluctantly go to war, and then only to preserve their freedom from outside invasion.

The personality of republican states also makes untenable the achievement of global peace by means of a world republic. An idealist might advocate a world republic on the ground that all peoples could live together under one global personality. Realists might advocate a world republic or government as the only way to prevent wars, skeptically substituting a powerful central regime for the hope that republics would refrain from war. Yet republics, having been formed by the will of a specific group of people, will be reluctant to surrender the autonomy achieved in that act of will to the will of other peoples. Thus, while the republican personality might give the idealist cause for hope, the realist will emphasize that "personalities," however much inclined they are toward community over conflict, will nevertheless insist on their autonomy.

These considerations necessitate the federation of free states. Although conflicts inevitably will arise among their differing personalities, the federation preserves the autonomy of each member state. Republican states, animated by their individual personalities and reluctant to go to war unnecessarily, are mindful of the need for a system of law to provide

collective security that is least threatening to individual autonomy. While finding such law in the federation, they no more attribute a truly good will to the participant states than they do to the citizens of the republic. Like the republic, the federation is necessarily a weak alternative nevertheless dictated by reason. It can come about when "a powerful and enlightened people" makes itself a republic, thereby inclining itself to perpetual peace, and in the interest of extending its freedom, coming to serve as a "fulcrum to the federation" (Kant 1957, 18-19, AA 356). At best, it will become "only the negative surrogate of an alliance which averts war, endures, spreads, and holds back the stream of those hostile passions which fear the law, though such an alliance is in constant peril of their breaking loose" (Kant 1957, 20, AA 357).

The federation is a pragmatic response to the imperative of perpetual peace. It meets the command of the categorical imperative to undertake actions that are universalizable but not totalistic. The categorical imperative prohibits actions that would lead directly to war but permits actions that, while perhaps not ideal, are benign. States can form themselves into a federation for the purpose of establishing a framework for peace without sacrificing their autonomy as personalities. Were it to be otherwise, realists would note, individual states would seek ways to break out of the federation. Idealism obtains its de facto peace, whereas realism restrains the inclination toward a global autarchy that would ultimately prove fatal.

The federation is also consistent with the mutual respect formulation of the categorical imperative. The formation of a league among states, whose relationships are defined by a law they collectively choose, implements the requirement that they treat each other as ends. That they may continue to regard each other's actions with suspicion and maintain their national identity is consistent with the permission they have to treat each other as means. For idealism, states must treat each other as ends; for realism, they need not do so blindly at their own expense.

The third "Definitive Article" states: "The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality" (Kant 1957, 20, AA 357). Quite simply, all people possess "a right of temporary sojourn, a right to associate . . . by virtue of their common possession of the surface of the earth" (Kant 1957, 21, AA 358). Idealism's commands here, as they so often are, are double-edged. People as individuals have the right to travel to other places controlled by other states. Merely occupying a piece of ground does not entitle one people to exclude others. Yet, just as physical possession does not grant exclusive title, the common possession of Earth does not permit invasion, pillage, and colonialism. If all states acted in accordance with these limiting principles, no state could entirely isolate itself or intrude so completely on another as to undermine the latter's self-identity. The integrity of the state as personality is as dependent upon

contact with other states as on security against excessive intrusion.

As always, idealism's standards cannot be met by idealist means. Rather, Kant suggests that the principal form of the contact between states is commercial. One need not rely on idealist notions of cosmopolitan sensibility that bring "the human race . . . closer and closer to a constitution establishing world citizenship" (Kant 1957, 21, AA358). The profit motive will be increasingly sufficient to reduce the likelihood that violence will be used to resolve the inevitable conflicts among human societies. Just as good citizenship at the domestic level depends more on organization than on virtue, a global "kingdom of ends"[10] depends more on the invisible hand of the marketplace than on the triumph of good over evil.

The "Definitive Articles," centrally located in the essay, are also the centerpiece of its conceptual composition. They reject in turn those realist assertions of the intractability of war: that human nature is warlike; that nation-states, by definition, cannot forbear war; and that mutual understanding and "hospitality" between peoples are restrained by and can thus never overcome the previous two assertions. Each assertion, considered as a matter of realistic thinking, stands refuted on the ground of the irrefutability, and hence possibility, of the commands of idealism.

The "Definitive Articles" reject the idealist notion that merely asserting the possibility of political right guarantees its success. They do so by insisting that while the appropriate steps toward peace must be consistent with the categorical imperative, they must nevertheless occur in space and time and thus be consistent with political prudence. National governments cannot be pure democracies. International organization cannot be world government. World citizenship does not obliterate nationalism.

In these ways, the "Definitive Articles" comprise a practical formula for the "establishment" of the peace described in the "Preliminary Articles." They demand the fulfillment of both narrow and wide duties. The categorical imperative is intended to promote the same critical standpoint in practical affairs that is required in epistemology. The attainment of peace thus requires a "political wisdom" that critically restrains the realist and idealist extremes to which each is led by the proximity and vanity of its perspective (Kant 1929, A475, B503). Only in this way can reason fulfill its "architectonic interest" — indeed, its very survival — by escaping the peace of the innkeeper's sign (Kant 1929, A474-475, B502-503). Whether nations, their leaders, or their citizens would sacrifice their own self-interest to the longer-term vision of a lasting peace begs the question of the prospects for peace and the federation that is to maintain it. If there is no hope of humanity taking such actions, there is little point in discussing the Preliminary and Definitive Articles other than, perhaps, to produce a kind of anthropology of political ideas. Since Kant disdained such idle speculation, his response to the question of hope warrants close scrutiny.

III

In order to fathom and evaluate Kant's response to this important question of hope, we return to the categorical imperative, which is the fruit of Kant's search for a fundamental moral principle applicable to all human situations (Sullivan 1989, 149). In addition to serving as a guide for action, the categorical imperative is also the expression of the first proof that there is hope for peace. In the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant foreshadows his later work in practical philosophy. He assumes that "there really are pure moral laws which determine, completely *a priori* (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness) what is and is not to be done," and that "since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place" (Kant 1929, A807, B835). Here and in his ethical works, Kant argues both that there is a moral law and that, if it is to be taken seriously, it entails the concept of duty.

This theme is continued in Perpetual Peace:

> Taken objectively, morality is in itself practical, being the totality of unconditionally mandatory laws according to which we ought to act. It would obviously be absurd, after granting authority to the concept of duty, to pretend that we cannot do our duty. ... Consequently, there can be no conflict of politics as a practical doctrine of right, with ethics, as a theoretical doctrine of right. (Kant 1957, 35, AA 370)

As Kant (1957, 46, AA 380) puts it, the first justification for hope is that "pure principles of right have objective reality." The vision of peace implicit in idealism and specified in the Preliminary Articles is actual. It therefore entails the duty obey it. Yet, the mere assertion that the idea of perpetual peace is actual, that we have a duty to fulfill it, and that that duty implies possibility is insufficient proof of hope that we might actually do so. For realism, this would be the height of idealism's folly. No ruler can be expected to make the sacrificial leap of faith entailed by such a duty.

In order to strengthen his position on this issue, Kant offers a political formulation of the categorical imperative: "All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with publicity" (Kant 1957, 47, AA 381). This formulation asks whether an action with political consequences is capable of passing public scrutiny. Secret machinations, policies, and agendas are suspect by definition. Publicity requires full disclosure. If any attributes of any action or agreement could not survive unless hidden from those affected, then the agreement or action must be discarded.

The publicity formulation restates the universalization formulation of the categorical imperative in empirical language and thereby serves

as the vehicle by which ought becomes is in politics. More precisely, the publicity requirement sets a standard for politics and provides a concrete way to measure its attainment. As discussed by Kant in the Preliminary Articles, the most important component of peaceful politics is trust. Publicity requires that parties to an agreement promise not to undercut it by secret decisions. It is simply the rule of non-contradiction: where there is deception, there is no real agreement; and where there is no agreement, there can be no peace.

Realists will be skeptical of this argument. Even though there is a practical formula for measuring the conformity of politics with the moral law, there is still no apparent incentive for rulers or the public to apply it. Kant (1957, 33-34, AA 368-369) offers an ironic response in the "Secret Article for Perpetual Peace." He begins by reemphasizing that secret clauses in contracts, especially those having to do with political society, are a fundamental violation of the law of non-contradiction. He then proceeds to the ironic exception to this rule: rulers may keep secret from their respective publics and each other that they listen to the advice of philosophers.

This exception is made for several reasons. First, philosophers are the bearers of the moral law because they possess and articulate "the untrammeled judgment of reason." Since they are "by nature incapable of plotting and lobbying," they can be trusted to speak candidly. Second, leaders are expected to strike the pose of might, not right, to their enemies. It would be "humiliating to the legislative authority of a state" if its susceptibility to the influence of philosophers were known by its enemies (Kant 1957, 33, AA 368). Third, philosophers should not be given any more than a hearing because to give them power of influence would "inevitably" corrupt their judgment. Fourth, as a practical matter, this proviso is not to suggest that "kings or kinglike peoples who rule themselves" ought to become philosophers, for their task is governing, not contemplation. Yet rulers, whether in monarchy or republics, should always allow philosophers to speak because their opinions are "indispensable to the enlightenment of the business of government." In any case, to censor philosophers is to acknowledge their influence (Kant 1957, 34, AA 369).

Hope for peace is strengthened by the "Secret Article" because philosophers are the voice of idealists, the keepers of the moral law. Since the possibility of their influence is to be kept secret, there is no reason to silence them and the idea of peace they articulate. Thus, says Kant (1957, 46, AA 380), "the moral principle in man is never extinguished." Likewise, idealists are not to have the influence that would lead to a dangerous neglect of the practical matters so central to statesmanship. Leaders need not be idealists but may concentrate on the realist task assigned to them. Nevertheless, their actions will always occur against the backdrop of the command, "There shall be no war" (Kant 1991, 160, AA 354).

A derivative significance of the "Secret Article" in Perpetual Peace is its permissiveness. The publicity requirement of the categorical imperative is not absolute with regard to philosophers. Just as actions that do not contradict the universalization or mutual respect formulations of the categorical imperative are permitted, so too are actions that do not directly contradict publicity. For instance, standing armies can be maintained without violating universalization; states within a federation can still be wary of member states without violating mutual respect; and weapons development, lend-lease plans, and even doomsday planning could remain secret without violating the rule of publicity. The categorical imperative lays down boundaries to action, narrow duties, which are absolute. Yet, there is wide latitude in practice by which to meet these obligations.

On the question of hope for peace, Kant to this point has: 1) declared the objectivity of the moral law that requires peace; 2) established a concrete means for measuring political conformity to the categorical imperative (publicity); 3) identified a class of people (philosophers) who articulate that law; and 4) rendered it unnecessary for leaders to acknowledge that they are guided by morality. He has not, however, answered the question. After all, even if leaders were to listen to and act upon the advice of philosophers, they might not meet with enough success to sustain that course of action. In other words, virtuous ends do not guarantee successful means. According to the "First Supplement: On the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace," nature, not human action, provides this guarantee.

In this section, Kant posits nature directing humanity toward peace in spite of itself. In particular, those hostile inclinations that lead people to war actually serve to draw them closer to the idea of peace by highlighting the costs of war. Differences of "language and religion" serve to prevent attempts at world government while also increasing the propensity to engage in commerce which is "incompatible with war" (Kant 1957, 31-32, AA 367-368).

Although Kant (1957, 30-31, AA 366-367) is careful not to attribute to nature "the profound wisdom of a higher cause" or "a cunning contrivance," he might as well have done so, for he cannot resist exclaiming that "[n]ature inexorably wills that the right should finally triumph," even if not by attaining "the moral improvement of men." Nature "guarantees perpetual peace by the mechanism of human passions." Yet, "she does not do so with sufficient certainty for us to predict the future in any theoretical sense," even though the hunger for hope might make our empirical observations of human interrelations appear to confirm that this is nature's design. It therefore remains our duty to work for peace consciously (Kant 1957, 32, AA 368).

The question of hope is again a question of human volition: hope for peace depends upon the willingness of human beings to pursue peace.

Kant's answer relies upon the practical idea that individual personalities must be combined into a collective personality. Individuals will not will peace. But if merged into a collective, they acquire a social personality that can will peace for them. As a practical matter, Kant is careful to note that this collective personality can only be formed by means of coercion. One "legislator" will have to form a nation from "a horde of savages" (Kant 1957, 36, AA 371). This being so, the legislator will be unwilling to permit them to form their own constitution. Because rule thus begins with force, it will be exercised tyrannically. Hope for peace continues to rest upon volition, albeit of the leadership of a single nation.

The leader of a nation founded in coercion must, of course, maintain the collective through coercion. It becomes difficult to see how leaders and their policies can be anything but realist. A leader might err as a "despotic moralist," prematurely acting on idealist principles without giving due attention to practical constraints. Nonetheless, time and experience will cause leaders and their successors to take a more realistic course (Kant 1957, 38-39, AA 373). On the other hand, rulers who cannot forget that nations are formed by force are unlikely to shape policy in accordance with anything other than practical experience. As this is likely always to teach them cynicism about human nature, the idea of peace, let alone its deliberate pursuit, will not constitute an influence over policy. Unlike the "despotic moralist," the "political moralist" will never "learn" from experience but will instead be guided by it, forgetting that the establishment of a collectivity, albeit by force, merely fulfills a wide duty on the way to fulfillment of the narrow duty toward peace.

Kant is confident that political moralists, the epitome of realism in politics, cannot continue indefinitely. Their maxims are transparent, self-contradictory, and ultimately self-destructive (Kant 1957, 40, 45, AA 374-5, 379). Their arrogance is impossible to sustain because of the variety, number, and complexity of information they must use in their calculations (Kant 1957, 43, AA 377). Even if they mean to achieve peace, as most realists claim to do, they are more likely to be ensnared by their own machinations. The tragedy of realism for a people is that its demise and whatever lessons it has to teach are a long time in coming.

Better, says Kant, that rulers adopt "political wisdom" as their guide. While a course of action must be thoroughly grounded in the intricacies of empirical experience, no action should be taken that cannot fit the standard of publicity. Prudent maxims that also conform to the political formulation of the categorical imperative will achieve peace more effectively than either idealism or realism. The principle of publicity defines that narrow duty in the fulfillment of which leaders may choose any number of pragmatic courses. In times of intensely confused conflict, the best course would be to take small, sometimes seemingly cold-hearted

steps more consistent with a thoroughgoing realism. At other times, commerce or war-weariness may make possible grander idealist steps toward peace, such as the establishment of international institutions and agreements. The wisdom of experience tempered by a focus on the advancement toward peace would determine the extent of action under either scenario, bounded always by the requirement of publicity.

Kant's response to the question of hope rests ultimately on his provision of a rule, publicity, by which realism and idealism might be balanced in politics. He seeks both empirical and moral grounds for guaranteeing that peace can, and will, be achieved. That guarantee, however, is always dependent upon human volition. Knowledge of the moral imperative does not assure that the duty will be met; philosophers might not be permitted to keep the idea alive; and rulers might not take up their duties. Hope for peace is embodied in its availability, not its necessity. The objective reality of the idea of perpetual peace simply does not guarantee its practical manifestation.

IV

Kant's failure to answer with finality the question of whether there is hope for perpetual peace is wholly consistent with his "critical" philosophy. Moreover, this failure captures the message of *Perpetual Peace* for practitioners and theorists of international politics alike. The antinomy between idealism and realism is amenable only to mediation, not resolution. Like antinomies of knowledge (freedom and causality), ethics (autonomy and heteronomy), and religion (God and nature), so too do human understanding and pure reason leave us, at best, with an orderly untidiness. The order results from criticism's restraint of the poles of each antinomy. The untidiness follows because criticism is an ongoing process: new data, new situations, new beliefs, and new interests reinvigorate the antinomies of knowledge, ethics, religion, and politics. There seems to be no guarantee of perpetual peace.

Even though he genuinely despises the cruel brutality and irrationality of the practice of politics at all levels of governance, Kant never offers more than speculative hope for an end to it. To do otherwise would go well beyond the boundaries of his philosophical system. Instead, he offers hopefulness grounded in the establishment of liberal (republican) polities and their international parallel, the Federation. Liberalism's chief virtue is its institutionalization of a critical perspective sufficient to restrain the darkness of realist despair and the blinding light of idealist hubris. Its openness and intelligence make any long-term commitment to either polarity nearly impossible and minimize any historically significant damage stemming from such commitments. Of course, either idealism or realism, separately or in tragic combination, can return to

wreak their special havoc on a global scale at any time. Nevertheless, Kant urges us to be hopeful that such episodes will be brief, survivable, and increasingly infrequent. As the number of liberal regimes increases, he hypothesizes, the less likely will be violent outbreaks among them. Nature will "accomplish what reason could have suggested ... without so much sad experience" (Kant 1949, 120).

Kant's hypotheses have been put to the test by history and the relatively sophisticated tools of social scientific analysis that emerged after World War II. Under the heading of the "Democratic Peace Debate," scholars of international politics have examined the empirical evidence to determine whether, and if so, why, liberal democracies pursue nonviolent means of resolving the conflicts that arise among them. The democratic peace thesis, initially framed by Doyle (1983), has sparked much scholarly debate.[11] Yet, the western democracies, led by the United States, have pronounced a renewed commitment to pro-democratic policies on the presupposition that democracies (the republican form) are inclined to peace at least with one another.

Based upon a survey of wars over a two hundred year period, Doyle (1983, 213) concludes that "even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another." He takes a Kantian approach to explain his claim by looking to the internal character of modern liberal democracy. Such regimes, he says, possess a commitment to mutual non-intervention, regular rotation in office, and stabilizing internal constitutional structures such as separation of powers. Anticipating realist criticism, Doyle is careful to note that these regimes do not hesitate to go to war with non-democratic states when it is in their interest to do so. Still, he insists that realism cannot deny his findings. Even if peace among democratic states is little more than "prudent diplomacy," this "cannot account for more than a century and a half of peace among independent liberal states, many of which have crowded one another in the center of Europe" (Doyle 1983, 213).

Dixon (1994) takes as a given that democracies are as likely to become engaged in international conflict as are non-democracies, but he also recognizes that they are more likely to settle serious disputes with one another before military hostilities develop."In his "search for a satisfactory explanation," he turns to the procedural norms he finds to typify democracies."The particular bundle of norms to which he attributes the tendency of democracies to seek peaceful settlements to their disputes is "bounded competition.""In the management of their own highly competitive internal affairs (elections and markets, for example), democracies develop habits and skills at conflict resolution that are then carried over into their relations with other similarly constituted states."As a result, when democra-

cies do confront other democracies, "these shared norms of bounded competition will provide a mutual basis for contingent consent, suggesting that disputes between democracies should evolve somewhat differently than do disputes between states not sharing these norms" (Dixon 1994, 17).

Of the many realist critiques of the democratic peace thesis, that of Farber and Gowa (1995) is typical."Doyle's evidence, they argue, can be explained as prudence at work; democratic norms are not necessarily the reason for the apparent pacific union among liberal democracies." Since peaceful conflict resolution usually perpetuates the status quo to the advantage of winners, they are likely publicly to celebrate such outcomes in terms that de-emphasize self-interest. Moreover, negotiated settlements are less expensive than wars, especially when high-stakes international commerce is involved." If liberal democracies are so peace loving, they ask, why are they willing to go to war with undemocratic states?" They also question the data itself." Besides claiming that the pacific union among liberal democracies existed mainly during the Cold War era, they make the Hobbesian point that the threat of war is sufficient to characterize a conflict as war." Thus, they emphasize incidents of "militarized interstate disputes."

In another variation of the realist critique, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) reconfigure the data to distinguish between mature and emerging democracies. The latter, they claim, lack the institutional stability required to restrain the war-making inclinations of those elite interests and parties that stand to lose in democratization."The ferocity of elite power struggles makes emerging democracies particularly dangerous." Promoting democracy around the world in the name of the democratic peace could produce another of those ironies so typical of politics: "idealism's faith in democracy is turned on its head by the instability of democratization."According to another of realism's proponents, democratic peace theory is "dangerous" in that its "zone of peace is a peace of illusions. There is no evidence that democracy at the unit level negates the structural effects of anarchy at the level of the international political system"(Layne 1994, 48; also see Waltz 1959). Elsewhere he observes that "the democratic-peace theory blinds us to the fact that what really counts in international politics is power." Capturing Kant's own warnings in the preliminary articles against idealism's tendency to be too trusting too quickly, another realist concludes that "certain states that we don't worry about now as threats to our security, because they are democracies, may in fact prove to be real threats down the line. If we have ideological blinders on, we may not see that" (Shea 1996, A7).

More recent work on the democratic peace has focused not on whether, but on why, democracies do not go to war with one another."Bruce Buena De Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alistair Smith

(1999, 791) declare that ìthe empirical evidence for this claim is quite strong." While they emphasize the claim of Kant and Doyle that domestic political institutions matter in foreign policy choice (deciding whether to go to war, for example), they reject, along with normative explanations, those institutional explanations that rely on the public's restraint of political leaders in matters of war and peace. Their alternative explanation, based on a realism grounded in game theory, portrays political leaders who respond to the institutional incentives of liberal democracies much like the "intelligent devils" in Kant's *Perpetual Peace* (Kant 1957, 30, AA 366). With their hold on power tied to public approval through elections, such leaders choose only wars they can win, and they make an all-out effort to do so. Since democratic leaders can attribute this quality to their counterparts in other liberal democracies, they are less likely to bear the expense and risk of going to war with each other.

This latter approach to the question of the democratic peace is consistent with Kant's. Although the reluctance of democratic states to war with one another is based upon "prudent diplomacy," the end of peace is achieved in its ideal form. The institutional arrangements of liberal democracies make them better suited than non-democratic states to peaceful international relations. They are also more suited to global trade and intercourse than are non-democratic states. Finally, their internal commitment to a constitution that promotes individual freedom and equality addresses Kant's First Definitive Article.

Kant would undoubtedly be gratified to know that modern political science has had such confidence in its empirical verification of his thesis. Yet, he would also warn that this affirmation should not be allowed to feed an idealism that might be inclined to advocate democratization without concern for the dangers cited by Mansfield and Snyder (1995). Indeed, the democratic peace may prove to be only a western phenomenon, as the personalities of emerging nations may not favor democracy. Nor would Kant dismiss Layne's warning that friends may not always be friends. The categorical imperative's insistence that we treat others always as ends and never as means only permits treating others as means. The very existence of a state system consisting of independent nations that can be united, at best, within a federation is indicative of the potential for any of those states to become warriors against their confederates.

For Kant, the goal must always be to strengthen the prospects for a lasting peace. Neither idealism nor realism must be allowed to dominate foreign policy. A careful, critical balance must be struck between them so as "to prevent precipitation which might injure the goal striven for" (Kant 1957, 8, AA 347). In other words, modern states should not allow their confidence in the democratic peace to blind them to the verities of international relations. Likewise, they must not allow their skepticism to deny

and undermine what contemporary political science has affirmed. The ideological passions of idealism and the cold calculations of realism are the necessary means to the end of achieving peace. As Kant (1957, 46, AA 380) concludes, "All politics must bend its knee before the right."

Notes

1. Citations of Kant's work in this article include references to volume 8 of *Kant's gesammelte Schriften* (28 vols., Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1904ff.), the "Academy Edition," which I abbreviate as AA.

2. The classic statement of the distinction between "utopian" and "realist" theories of international politics is found in Carr (1939). Also see Waltz (1959). Doyle (1983) treats realism at length in the context of his discussion of the democratic peace. For a critical treatment of idealism as "Wilsonianism," see Layne (1994).

3. O'Neill (1986, 524) observes that Kant's "entire critical enterprise has a certain political character." Also see Arendt (1982), Friedrich (1948), Humphrey (1983), Laursen (1986), Mulholland (1987), OíNeill (1989), Reiss (1970), Riley (1983), and Saner (1973).

4. Citations of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in this article include references to both the A and B editions.

5. Kant's passion for his subject and for the significance of the nature / freedom antinomy is movingly expressed in the following metaphor from *The Critique of Practical Reason:* "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me" (Kant 1956, 166, AA 161).

6. For an interesting discussion attributing the "innkeeper's sign" metaphor to the work of Kant's predecessor, Leibniz, see Riley (1983, 122).

7. For an extensive discussion of Kant as contract theorist, see Riley (1983).

8. This would be the political equivalent of the metaphysical principle that "an event which should follow upon an empty time, that is, a coming to be preceded by no state of things, is as little capable of being apprehended as empty time itself" (Kant 1929, A192, B237).

9. For a discussion, see Sullivan (1989, 51-54).

10. The reference here to a "kingdom of ends" is intended to emphasize a critical understanding of Kant's political theory. As is true throughout his practical philosophy, Kant wants human action directed toward attaining an ideal community. This, however, is the ideal for Kant, and his perspective requires that it be carefully balanced against what is possible. There cannot be any compromise on what the goal of human action is to be, in this case perpetual peace among nations. Yet, the idea of that goal must not become the controlling fact in efforts toward its realization. The categorical imperative insists only that the goal not be fundamentally contradicted and undermined. It fully recognizes that until the kingdom of ends is reached, there will be imperfections. See Hill (1991, 73), O'Neill (1989, 127-128), and Sullivan (258-260).

11. Doyle (1983) and Dixon (1994) credit the Correlates of War Project with the establishment of the body of empirical research relating democracy and peace. See, for instance, Small and Singer (1976, 1982). An excellent review of the major themes in this body of research may be found in Chan (1997).

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